Psychological research shows that we can behave or decide in discriminatory ways without being aware of doing so. A person may reject a candidate for a job because of their gender, ethnicity, or age for example, but think they made a fair decision. How is this possible?
In the literature it is typically assumed that an underlying psychological state is responsible for the problems. Accordingly, how to measure and characterize this state has been one central topic of discussion. But what if this strong focus on the nature and measurement of this implicit attitude is not the best strategy? What if, instead of enriching our understanding of implicit bias, this approach narrows our view and directs attention away from the real issue?
During the workshop ‘Implicit bias: What are we missing?’, organized at the Munich School of Philosophy on the 11th and 12th of October 2023, the central aim was to discuss other approaches to understanding and overcoming the problem of implicit bias. It turned out to be a fruitful exchange, in which different perspectives were presented that could mutually strengthen each other.
One central theme throughout the workshop was the embodied and phenomenological nature of implicit bias. The first keynote speaker, Céline Leboeuf, emphasized the role of perceptual and embodied habits in implicit bias. Implicit bias is not in the head, but reflected in our practical relation to the environment. A similar perceptive was adopted by Sofia Livi. Her focus was on olfaction; she argued that it blurs the distinction between subject and object. Daniel Vespermann analyzed the relationship between implicit bias and feeling of familiarity from the perspective of phenomenology and 4E accounts of cognition. Relatedly, it was argued that the perspective of the harmed person cannot be ignored. Yael Peled and Anna Drożdżowicz emphasized the experiential perspective of the person in linguistic discrimination, and Jasper St Bernard analyzed the phenomenology of racism and how it disrupts the body schema on the basis of Frantz Fanon’s work. As he argued, simply ascribing a mental state to explain implicit bias misses the point.
These perspectives on implicit bias can be connected to a more general view on how we make sense of the world. Thomas Wachtendorf emphasized the role of Wittgenstein’s world-pictures, backgrounds against which we distinguish between true and false, in implicit bias. Jordi Fairhurst Chilton and José Antonio Pérez Escobar’s maintained that hinges play a crucial role in prejudice: basic presuppositions of our worldviews of which we are certain, which are resistant to counterevidence and regulate judgments and behaviors in a certain domain.
Another central theme in the workshop was actual discriminatory behavior. Jan De Houwer, the second keynote speaker, argued that we should focus on the automatic way in which people respond to social features, and under which suboptimal conditions this takes place. This perspective emphasizes that, because of its counterfactual nature, it is often difficult to recognize implicit bias in real life. The third keynote, Annemarie Kalis argued that we should reflect on the normative nature of belief ascription. Self-ascription of belief implies commitment. When we ascribe an implicit bias to a person, this person fails to meet the normative expectation of treating people fairly. Relatedly, Pelin Kasar emphasized the dispositional nature of implicit bias; the central issue is how we actually respond to members of certain social groups. She also argued that an account of implicit bias should include its social nature. This was also central in Nathan Lackey’s presentation: (how) can we integrate individualist and situationist approaches to implicit bias? Finally, Christopher Koska offered valuable reflections on the difficulties of implementing AI to reduce implicit biases in child welfare assessment.
– Dr. Lieke Asma, Project-Lead Implicit Bias: What Are We Missing?
