ON DIALECTIC

CHAPTER I. SIMPLE WORDS[1]

[5] Dialectic is the science of disputing well.[2] We always dispute with words. Now words are simple or combined.[3] Words which signify some one thing are simple, as when we say '*homo*,' '*equus*,' '*disputat*,' '*currit*' (man, horse, disputes, runs). Do not be surprised that '*disputat*' is classified as simple although it is composed of two elements.[4] This is made clear by our definition; for that is said to be simple which signifies some one thing. And so '*disputat*' is included in this definition. On the other hand, the word[5] '*loquor*' (I speak) is not included. For even though the latter is one word, it does not have a simple signification, since it also signifies the person who speaks. Now for this reason it is subject to truth or falsity, for it can be denied and affirmed. So every first and second person verb, although it is expressed singly, nevertheless is classified as a combined word, because it does not have a simple signification. For whoever says '*ambulo*' (I am walking) causes both the walking and he himself, who is walking, to be understood. And whoever says '*ambulas*' (you are walking) in a similar manner signifies both the thing which is done and the person who does it. On the other hand, whoever says '*ambulat*' (walks) signifies only walking. For this reason a third person verb is always classified as simple and it cannot be affirmed or denied except in the case of verbs which have the signification of the person necessarily attached to them in ordinary usage. For example, the verbs '*pluit*' (it is raining) or '*ninguit*' (it is snowing) cannot be classified as simple words because, even though it is not added "who" rains or snows, it is understood.[6]

CHAPTER II. COMBINED WORDS

Combined words are those which, when connected to one another, signify many things, for example, when we say 'the man is walking' or 'the man

S. AURELII AUGUSTINI DE DIALECTICA LIBER

I

[5] Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. Disputamus autem utique verbis. Verba igitur aut simplicia| sunt aut coniuncta. Simplicia sunt quae unum quiddam significant ut cum dicimus 'homo, equus, disputat,| currit'. Nec mireris, quod 'disputat' quamvis ex duobus compositum sit tamen inter
5 simplicia numeratum est. / Nam res definitione illustratur. Dictum est enim id esse simplex quod unum quiddam significet. Itaque hoc| includitur[1] hac definitione qua non includitur[2] cum dicimus 'loquor'. Quamvis enim unum verbum sit, non| habet tamen simplicem significationem, siquidem significat etiam personam quae loquitur. Ideo iam obnoxium| est veritati aut falsitati, nam et negari et affirmari potest. Omnis itaque prima et secunda persona verbi quam|vis singillatim enuntietur tamen inter coniuncta verba numerabitur, quia simplicem non habet significa-
10 tionem. / Siquidem quisquis dicit 'ambulo' et ambulationem facit intellegi et se ipsum qui ambulat, et quisquis dicit[3]| 'ambulas' similiter et rem quae fit et eum qui facit significat. At vero qui dicit 'ambulat' nihil aliud quam| ipsam significat ambulationem. Quamobrem tertia persona verbi semper inter simplicia numeratur[4] et nondum| aut affirmari aut negari potest, nisi cum talia verba sunt, quibus necessario cohaeret personae significatio con|suetudine loquendi, ut cum dicimus 'pluit' vel 'ninguit'[5],
15 etiamsi non addatur quis pluat aut ninguat, tamen / quia intellegitur non potest inter simplicia numerari.

II

Coniuncta verba sunt quae sibi conexa res plures significant, ut cum dicimus 'homo ambulat' aut| 'homo festinans in montem ambulat' et siquid tale. Sed coniunctorum verborum alia sunt quae sen|tentiam com-

1 & 2 includimur G. 3 dicat QG. 4 numerabitur OG. 5 ninguet D ningit B.

prehendunt, ut ea quae dicta sunt: ⟨alia quae⟩ expectant aliquid ⟨ad
[6] completionem sententiae⟩[6] ut eadem / ipsa quae nunc diximus, si subtrahas verbum quod positum est 'ambulat'[7]. Quamvis enim verba coniuncta sint| 'homo festinans in montem', tamen adhuc pendet oratio. Separatis igitur his coniunctis verbis quae non| implent sententiam restant ea verba coniuncta quae sententiam comprehendunt. Horum item duae species sunt.| Aut enim sic sententia comprehenditur, ut vero aut falso
5 teneatur obnoxia, ut est 'omnis homo ambulat' / aut 'omnis homo non ambulat' et si quid huiusmodi est. Aut ita[9] impletur sententia, ut licet perficiat pro|positum animi, affirmari tamen[10] negarive non possit, ut cum imperamus, cum optamus, cum execramur[11] et[12]| similia. Nam quisquis dicit[13] 'perge ad villam' vel 'utinam pergat ad villam' vel[14] 'dii illum perduint[15]',| non potest argui quod mentiatur aut credi quod verum dicat[16]. Nihil enim affirmavit[17] aut[18] negavit[19]. Ergo nec| tales sententiae in quaestionem veniunt, ut disputatorem requirant.

III

10 Sed illae quae requirunt aut simplices / sunt aut coniunctae. Simplices sunt, quae sine ulla copulatione sententiae alterius enuntiantur, ut est illud| quod dicimus 'omnis homo ambulat'. Coniunctae sunt, de quarum copulatione iudicatur, ut est 'si am|bulat, movetur'. Sed cum de coniunctione sententiarum iudicium fit, tamdiu est, donec perveniatur ad| summam. Summa est autem quae conficitur ex concessis. Quod dico tale est. Qui dicit 'si ambulat, mo|vetur', probare vult aliquid, ut cum hoc[20]
15 concessero[21] verum esse, restet illi docere quod ambulet et[22] summa / consequatur, quae iam negari non potest, id est quod moveatur[23] – aut restet illi docere quod non moveatur[23],| ut consequatur summa, quae item non potest non[24] concedi, id est quod non ambulet. Rursus si hoc modo velit| dicere 'homo iste ambulat', simplex sententia est: quam si concessero et[25] adiunxerit aliam 'quisquis autem| ambulat movetur' et

6 alia – sententiae *conj. Crecelius, cf. etiam n. 25*: expectant aliquid DBPOQ alia quae non comprehendunt sed expectant aliquid G. 7 *om.* DBP. 9 itaque DPQ sic G. 10 tunc O *om.* G. 11 execramus DBP. 12 et: +his OG. 13 quisquis dicit: si quis dicat (dicit O) OQG. 14 aut OG. 15 perdant B^{ac}QG perdunt B^{pc} P. 16 dicit DBPQ. 17 affirmabit OQG. 18 vel OG. 19 negabit OQG. 20 hoc: +non DBP. 21 concesso G. 22 ut *conj. Hagen.* 23 *conj. Crecelius*: movetur *codd.* 24 *om.* OQG. 25 et: *om.* QG +alia (aliam et aliam QG) quae aliquid expectant ad completionem sententiae sententiam comprehendunt (comprehendit G) *codd. Cf. etiam n.* 6.

is walking quickly toward the mountain' and others of this kind. But among combined words there are some which make a statement, for example, those just cited, and there are others which require something
[6] further to complete the statement,[1] as in the case of the second example if we omit 'is walking.' For even though the words 'the man quickly toward the mountain' are combined, still the utterance is left hanging. If we leave aside these combined words which do not make a statement, there remain those combined words which do make a statement. But again there are two species of these. For either a statement is made in such a way that it is held to be subject to truth or falsity, such as 'every man is walking' or 'every man is not walking' and others of this kind. Or a statement is made in such a way that, although it fully expresses what one has in mind, it cannot be affirmed or denied, as when we command, wish, curse, and the like.[2] For whoever says 'go into the house' or 'oh that he would go into the house' or 'may the gods destroy that man' cannot be thought to lie or to tell the truth, since he did not affirm or deny anything. Such statements do not, therefore, come into question so as to require anyone to dispute them.[3]

CHAPTER III. SIMPLE AND COMBINED STATEMENTS

But those statements which require disputation are either simple or combined. Those are simple which are spoken without any connection with another statement, for example, 'every man is walking.' Those are combined in which a judgment is made in respect of their connection,[1] for example, 'if he is walking, he is moving.' Now when a judgment is made in respect of the connection of statements, a conclusion can be reached.[2] The conclusion is what is established on the basis of what is conceded. Here is what I mean. Whoever says 'if he is walking, he is moving' wishes to prove something, so that when I concede that this combined statement is true he only needs to assert that he is walking and the conclusion that he is moving follows and cannot now be denied, or he need only assert that he is not moving and the conclusion that he is not walking must be agreed to. Or, to put it another way, one can say 'that man is walking.' This is a simple statement. But if I concede its truth, then he can add a further statement: 'whoever is walking is moving.'

hanc etiam[26] concessero, ex hac coniunctione sententiarum quamvis singillatim enun|tiatarum et concessarum illa summa sequitur, quae iam necessario concedatur, id est 'homo iste igitur / movetur'.|

IV

His[27] breviter constitutis singulas partes consideremus. Nam sunt primae[28] duae: una de his quae simpli|citer dicuntur, ubi est quasi materia dialecticae, altera de his quae coniuncta dicuntur, ubi iam quasi opus| apparet. Quae de simplicibus est vocatur de loquendo. Illa vero quae de
[7] coniunctis est in tres partes dividitur. / Separata enim coniunctione verborum quae non implet sententiam, illa, quae sic implet sententiam, ut nondum| faciat quaestionem vel disputatorem requirat, vocatur de eloquendo; illa, quae sic implet sententiam, ut de sen|tentiis simplicibus iudicetur, vocatur de proloquendo; illa, quae sic comprehendit sententiam, ut de ipsa etiam| copulatione iudicetur donec perveniatur ad summam, vocatur de proloquiorum summa. Has ergo singulas / partes diligentius explicemus.|

V

Verbum est uniuscuiusque rei[29] signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. Res est| quidquid vel sentitur vel intellegitur vel latet. Signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid| animo ostendit. Loqui est articulata voce signum dare. Articulatam autem dico quae[30] comprehendi litteris| potest. Haec[31] omnia quae definita sunt, utrum recte definita sint et utrum hactenus verba definitionis aliis / definitionibus persequenda fuerint, ille indicabit locus, quo[32] definiendi disciplina tractatur. Nunc quod instat| accipe intentus. Omne verbum

26 etiam: +si OQG. 27 His: +igitur OQG. 28 primae: +et DB +*rasura* P. 29 *om.* DBP. 30 quod G. 31 Haec: +autem OG. 32 quo: in quo P^{pc}OQG.

And if I agree to this, even though the two statements now conceded were stated singly, there follows from the connection of them a conclusion, which must be agreed to, namely, 'therefore, that man is moving.'[3]

CHAPTER IV. THE PARTS OF DIALECTIC[1]

Having given this brief exposition, let us now consider the parts [of dialectic] one by one. The first division is twofold: one concerning those things which are spoken simply, and this is, as it were, the raw material of dialectic; the other concerning those things which are spoken in combination, and in this we see, as it were, the finished product of dialectic. The part of dialectic which is about simple words is called 'on naming.'
[7] That which concerns combined words is divided into three parts. Leaving aside that combining of words which does not make a complete statement, there is, first, that which makes a complete statement but in such a way as not to require questioning or disputing. The part of dialectic concerning such statements is called 'on expressing.' There is, second, that combining of words which makes a complete statement in such a way that a judgment is made in respect of simple statements. The part of dialectic concerning such statements is called 'on asserting.' Finally, there are words which make a statement in such a way that a judgment is made in respect of the connection of statements in it so as to arrive at a conclusion. The part of dialectic dealing with such statements is called 'on concluding from assertions.' Therefore we shall carefully set forth these parts, one by one.[2]

CHAPTER V. SIGNIFICATION[1]

A word is a sign of any sort of thing. It is spoken by a speaker and can be understood by a hearer. A thing is whatever is sensed or is understood or is hidden.[2] A sign is something which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something beyond the sign itself.[3] To speak is to give a sign by means of an articulate utterance. By an articulate utterance I mean one which can be expressed in letters.[4] Whether all these things that have been defined have been correctly defined and whether the words used in definition so far will have to be followed by other definitions, will be shown in the passage in which the discipline of defining is discussed.[5] For the present, pay strict attention to the material at hand.

sonat. Cum enim est in scripto, non verbum sed verbi signum est; quippe| inspectis a legente litteris occurrit animo, quid[33] voce prorumpat. Quid enim aliud litterae scriptae[34] quam se| ipsas oculis,[35]| praeter se voces animo ostendunt. Et[36] paulo ante diximus signum esse quod se ipsum sensui et| praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. Quae legimus igitur
15 non verba sunt sed signa verborum. Sed ut, ipsa lit/tera cum sit pars minima vocis articulatae, abutimur tamen hoc vocabulo, ut[37] appellemus litteram etiam cum| scriptam[38] videmus, quamvis omnino tacita sit neque ulla pars vocis sed signum partis vocis appareat, ita etiam| verbum appellatur cum scriptum est, quamvis verbi signum id est signum significantis vocis non[39] ⟨verbum⟩[40] eluceat. Ergo| ut coeperam dicere omne verbum sonat. Sed quod sonat nihil ad dialecticam. De sono enim verbi agitur,| cum quaeritur vel animadvertitur, qualiter[41] vocalium vel dis-
20 positione[42] leniatur vel concursione dehiscat, item con/sonantium vel interpositione nodetur vel congestione asperetur, et quot vel qualibus syllabis constet, ubi poe|ticus rhythmus accentusque, ⟨quae⟩[43] a grammaticis solarum aurium tractantur[44] negotia.[45] Et tamen cum de his disputatur,| praeter dialecticam non est. Haec enim scientia disputandi est.
[8] Sed cum[46] verba sint[47] ⟨signa⟩[48] rerum, quando de ipsis[49] / obtinent, verborum autem illa, quibus de[50] his disputatur – nam cum de verbis loqui nisi verbis nequeamus et| cum loquimur nonnisi de aliquibus rebus loquimur – occurrit animo ita esse verba signa rerum, ut res esse| non desinant. Cum ergo verbum ore procedit, si propter se procedit id est ut de ipso verbo aliquid quaeratur| aut disputetur, res est utique disputationi
5 quaestionique subiecta, sed ipsa res verbum vocatur. Quidquid autem / ex verbo non aures sed animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, dicibile vocatur. Cum vero verbum| procedit non propter se sed propter aliud aliquid significandum, dictio vocatur. Res autem ipsa, quae iam| verbum non est neque verbi in mente conceptio, sive habeat verbum quo[51] significari possit, sive non habeat,| nihil aliud quam res vocatur proprio iam nomine. Haec ergo quattuor distincta teneantur; verbum,

33 quod OQ. 34 inscriptae OQG. 35 oculis: + et G *Crecelius*. 36 ut *conj. Crecelius*. 37 ut: et ut DBPOQ. 38 scriptum DBPOQ. 39 *erasit* G *secl. Crecelius*. 40 *supplevi duce Hagen*. 41 qualiter *conj. Usener*: quanta *codd.* 42 disputatione DBP^{ac}. 43 *supplevi*. 44 tractatur QG. 45 negotio P^{pc}G. 46 tunc G. 47 sunt G. 48 *suppl. Hagen*. 49 ipsis: + disputatur haec rerum vim *suppl. Hagen* scilicet intellectum *glossavit* G obtinent = =τυγχάνουσιν(?). 50 quibus de: de quibus G. 51 quod DQ.

Every word is a sound, for when it is written it is not a word but the sign of a word. When we read, the letters we see suggest to the mind the sounds of the utterance.[6] For written letters indicate to the eyes something other than themselves and indicate to the mind utterances beyond themselves. Now we have just said that a sign is something which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something beyond the sign itself. Therefore, what we read are not words but signs of words. For we misuse the term 'letter' when we call what we see written down a letter, for it is completely silent and is no part of an utterance but appears as the sign of a part of an utterance; whereas a letter as such is the smallest part of an articulate utterance. In the same way [we misuse the term 'word'] when we call what we see written down a word, for it appears as the sign of a word, that is, not as a word but as the sign of a significant utterance. Therefore, as I said above, every word is a sound.

But sounds are not the concern of dialectic. We concern ourselves with the sound of words when we ask about or attend to the use of vowels to make speech lighter, or to the combination of vowels in a word, or again to the arrangement of consonants for articulation, or their concentration for asperity of speech, to the number and quality of syllables, or the matter of poetic rhythm and accent. All such matters having to do with hearing alone are treated by the grammarian. Nevertheless, when there is dispute about these subjects, it is a concern of dialectic, for dialectic is the science of disputing. Words are signs of things whenever they refer to them, even though those [words] by which we dispute about [words] are [signs] of words. For since we are unable to speak of words except by words and since we do not speak unless we speak of some things, the mind recognizes that words are signs of things, without ceasing to be things. When, therefore, a word is uttered for its own sake, that is, so that something is being asked or argued about the word itself, clearly it is the thing which is the subject of disputation and inquiry; but the thing in this case is called a *verbum*.[7] Now that which the mind not the ears perceives from the word and which is held within the mind itself is called a *dicibile*. When a word is spoken not for its own sake but for the sake of signifying something else, it is called a *dictio*. The thing itself which is neither a word nor the conception of a word in the mind, whether or not it has a word by which it can be signified, is called nothing but a *res* in the proper sense of the name. Therefore, these four are to be kept

dicibile,| dictio, res. Quod dixi verbum, et verbum est et verbum significat. Quod dixi dicibile, verbum est, nec / tamen verbum, sed quod[52] in verbo intellegitur et animo continetur, significat. Quod dixi dictionem, verbum| est, sed quod iam illa duo simul id est et ipsum verbum et quod fit in animo per verbum significat. Quod| dixi rem, verbum est, quod praeter illa tria quae dicta sunt quidquid restat significat. Sed exemplis haec| illustranda esse perspicio. Fac igitur a quoquam[53] grammatico[54] – puerum interrogatum hoc modo: 'arma quae| pars orationis est?' quod dictum est 'arma', propter se dictum est id est verbum propter ipsum verbum. / Cetera vero, quod ait 'quae pars orationis', non propter se, sed propter verbum, quod 'arma' dictum est,| vel animo sensa vel voce prolata sunt. Sed cum animo sensa sunt, ante vocem dicibilia erunt[55]; cum autem| propter id quod dixi proruperunt in vocem, dictiones factae sunt. Ipsum vero 'arma' quod hic verbum est,| cum a Vergilio pronuntiatum est, dictio fuit: non enim propter se prolatum est, sed[56] ut eo significarentur vel| bella quae gessit Aeneas vel scutum vel[57] cetera[58] quae Vulcanus heroi[59] fabricatus est. Ipsa vero bella vel / arma, quae gesta aut ingestata[60] sunt ab Aenea – ipsa inquam quae, cum gererentur atque essent, videbantur,| quaeque si nunc adessent vel digito monstrare possemus aut tangere, quae etiamsi non cogitentur non eo| tamen fit ut non fuerint – ipsa ergo per se nec verba sunt nec dicibilia nec dictiones, sed res quae iam pro|prio nomine res vocantur. Tractandum est igitur nobis in hac parte dialecticae de verbis, de dicibilibus, de| dictionibus, de rebus. In quibus omnibus cum partim verba significentur partim non verba, nihil est tamen[61], / de quo non verbis disputare necesse sit. Itaque de his primo disputetur per quae de ceteris disputare conceditur.|

VI

Igitur verbum quodlibet excepto sono – de quo bene disputare ad facultatem dialectici pertinet, non| ad dialecticam disciplinam, ut defensiones Ciceronis sunt quidem rhetoricae facultatis sed non his docetur ipsa| rhetorica – ergo omne verbum praeter id quod sonat quattuor quaedam

52 quod: tale quo G. 53 quodam G. 54 grammaticum OQ. 55 sunt OQ. 56 *om.* DBP^{ac}. 57 et DBP. 58 cetera: + arma G. 59 aerea G. 60 bella – ingestata: bella quae gesta vel arma quae gestata *emendavit Keil approbante Hagen.* ingestata: igestata D ingesta BPOQG. 61 enim G.

distinct: the *verbum*, the *dicibile*, the *dictio*, and the *res*. '*Verbum*' both is a word and signifies a word. '*Dicibile*' is a word; however, it does not signify a word but what is understood in the word and contained in the mind. '*Dictio*' is also a word, but it signifies both the first two, that is, the word itself and what is brought about in the mind by means of the word. '*Res*' is a word which signifies whatever remains beyond the three that have been mentioned. But I recognize that these must be illustrated by examples.

Let us take as an example a grammarian questioning a boy in this manner: "What part of speech is '*arma*'?"[8] '*Arma*' is said for its own sake, the word for the sake of the word itself. The other words that he speaks, 'what part of speech,' whether they are understood by the mind or uttered by the voice, are not an end in themselves but concern the word '*arma*.' Now when we consider words as perceived in the mind, prior to utterance they are *dicibilia*, but when they are uttered, as I have said, they become *dictiones*. As for '*arma*,' in the context we supposed, it is a *verbum*, but when it was uttered by Vergil it was a *dictio*, for it was not said for its own sake but in order to signify either the wars which Aeneas waged, or his shield, or the other arms which Vulcan made for the hero. These wars or weapons, which were waged or worn by Aeneas, which were seen when they were waged or when they were, which, if they were now present, we could touch or point to, which, even if they were not thought of, would not be prevented from having existed – these things are neither *verba* nor *dicibilia* nor *dictiones*; they are things which are called '*res*' in the proper sense of the name. In this part of dialectic we must treat of *verba*, *dicibilia*, *dictiones*, and *res*.[9] Among all these it is sometimes words that are signified, sometimes not; but there is nothing about which it is not necessary to dispute with words. Therefore we will first dispute about words, by means of which, as all agree, other disputes are carried out.

CHAPTER VI. THE ORIGIN OF WORDS[1]

Any word whatsoever though not its sound – since its sound belongs to the exercise of dialectic to dispute well about but does not belong to the science of dialectic, just as the speeches of Cicero belong to the exercise of rhetoric but rhetoric itself is not taught by means of those speeches – every word, I say, apart from its sound, necessarily raises questions about

necessario[62] vocat in quaestionem:| originem suam, vim, declinationem, ordinationem.|

[9] / De origine verbi quaeritur, cum quaeritur unde ita dicatur, res mea sententia nimis curiosa et minus[63]| necessaria. Neque hoc eo mihi placuit dicere, quod Ciceroni[A] quoque idem videtur.| Quis enim egeat auctoritate in re tam perspicua? Quod si omnino multum iuvaret explicare[64] originem verbi,| ineptum esset aggredi quod persequi profecto infinitum est. Quis enim[65] reperire possit, quidquid dictum / fuerit unde ita dictum sit? Huc accedit quod ut somniorum interpretatio ita verborum origo pro cuiusque| ingenio iudicatur. Ecce enim 'verba' ipsa quispiam ex eo putat dicta quod aurem quasi verberent. Immo| inquit alius quod aërem. Sed quid nostra[66]? Non magna lis est, nam uterque a verberando huius vocabuli| originem trahit. Sed de transverso tertius vide quam rixam inferat. Quod enim verum nos ait[67] loqui oportet| odiosumque[68] sit[69] natura ipsa iudicante mendacium, 'verbum' a vero cognominatum est. Nec ingenium quartum / defuit. Nam sunt qui verbum a vero quidem dictum putant, sed prima syllaba satis animadversa secundam| neglegi non oportere. 'Verbum' enim cum dicimus, inquiunt, prima eius syllaba verum significat, secunda| sonum. Hoc enim[70] volunt esse 'bum', unde Ennius sonum pedum 'bombum[71] pedum' dixit et βοῆσαι[72] Graeci| clamare et Vergilius[B] 'reboant silvae'. Ergo verbum dictum est quasi a[73] verum[74] boando| hoc est verum[75] sonando. Quod si ita est, praescribit quidem hoc nomen, ne cum verbum facimus mentiamur; / sed vereor, ne ipsi qui dicunt ista mentiantur. Ergo ad te iam pertinet iudicare, utrum 'verbum' a verbe|rando an a vero solo an a[76] verum boando dictum putemus, an potius unde sit dictum non curemus, cum| quid significet intellegamus. Breviter tamen hunc locum notatum, hoc est de origine verborum, volo paulisper| accipias, ne ullam partem suscepti operis praetermississe videamur. Stoici autumant, quos Cicero in hac re| ut Cicero inridet, nullum esse verbum, cuius non certa explicari origo[77]

[A] Cicero, De natura deorum III, 24, 63. [B] Vergil, Georgica III, 223.

62 necessaria G. 63 nimis P[ac]Q non nimis OGP[pc]. 64 explicaret DBP. 65 quis enim: quamvis quis G. 66 nostram DBP[ac]. 67 nos ait: ait nos POQG. 68 otiosumquae D odiosum que G. 69 est *conj. Crecelius* fit *conj. Usener*. 70 autem OQG. 71 bumbum O bonbum D. 72 boesae D boesei B boese P[ac]Q boece O boose G. 73 *om.* OG. 74 vere OQG. 75 vere OG. 76 *om. G*. 77 explicari origo: explicari Q ratio explicari G.

[9] four things: its origin, force, declension, and arrangement.[2] We ask about the origin of a word when we ask why it is called such and such; but in my opinion this is more a matter of curiosity than necessity. And I do not feel that I am bound to say this because it is the opinion of Cicero.[3] For who needs authority in such a clear matter? Even though it is a great help to explicate the origin of a word, it is useless to start on a task whose prosecution would go on indefinitely. For who is able to discover why anything is called what it is called? Discerning the origin of words is like the interpretation of dreams; it is a matter of each man's ingenuity. Let us take as an example '*verbum*.'[4] One man thinks that *verba* are so called because, as it were, they *verberent* (strike or reverberate on) the ear; another man says they reverberate in the air. But what difference does this make to us? Their dispute is not great, for in either case the word is derived from '*verberans*.' But a third man introduces a dispute. He says that we ought to speak what is true and that a lie is judged hateful by its own nature; therefore a *verbum* is named from '*verum*' (true). And there is a fourth piece of cleverness, for there are those who agree that a *verbum* is named from '*verum*,' but think that attention should not be directed to the first syllable to the neglect of the second. For when we say '*verbum*,' they surmise, the first syllable signifies what is true, the second sound. And this latter they decide is '*bum*.' Thus Ennius calls the sound of hooves "*bombum pedum*"[5]; and in Greek 'to shout' is βοῆσαι. And Vergil says, "*reboant silvae*" (the woods resound).[6] Therefore '*verbum*' is derived, as it were, from '*verum boans*,' that is, from a sounding of what is true. If this be so, this word '*verbum*' certainly forbids us to lie when we produce a word. But I am afraid that those who say this are lying. Consequently it is up to you to judge whether you think '*verbum*' comes from '*verberans*' or from '*verum*' alone or from '*verum boans*' or whether its origin is a matter of indifference so long as we understand what it signifies.

Nevertheless I do wish for you to consider for a little while this topic which we have indicated briefly, namely, the origin of words, so that we might not seem to neglect any part of the work we have begun. The Stoics, whom Cicero ridicules in this matter, as only Cicero can, think that there is no word whose definite origin cannot be explained.[7] Because it would

possit. Et quia hoc modo eos urguere[78] / facile fuit, si diceres hoc infinitum esse, quibus verbis alicuius verbi originem interpretaris[79], eorum rursus / a te origo[80] ⟨quaeratur, aiunt hoc⟩[81] quaerendum[82] esse, donec perveniatur eo, ut res cum sono verbi aliqua similitudine| concinat, ut cum dicimus aeris tinnitum, equorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, stridorem| catenarum. Perspicis enim haec verba ita[83] sonare ut ipsae res quae his verbis significantur. Sed quia sunt res| quae non sonant, in his similitudinem tactus valere, ut, si leniter vel aspere sensum tangunt, lenitas vel / asperitas litterarum ut tangit auditum[84] sic eis nomina pepererit: ut ipsum 'lene' cum dicimus leniter sonat.| Quis item 'asperitatem' non et ipso nomine asperam iudicet? Lene est auribus cum dicimus 'voluptas',| asperum cum dicimus 'crux'. Ita res ipsae afficiunt[85], ut verba sentiuntur.[86] Mel, quam suaviter gustum res ipsa,| tam leniter nomine tangit auditum. 'Acre' in utroque asperum est. 'Lana' et 'vepres', ut audiuntur verba, sic| illa tanguntur. Haec quasi cunabula verborum esse crediderunt, ubi sensus rerum cum sonorum sensu con-/ cordarent. Hinc ad ipsarum inter se rerum similitudinem processisse licentiam nominandi; ut cum verbi causa| 'crux' propterea dicta sit, quod ipsius verbi asperitas cum doloris quem crux efficit asperitate concordat[87], 'crura'| tamen non propter asperitatem doloris sed, quod longitudine atque duritie[88] inter membra cetera sint ligno| ⟨crucis⟩[89] similiora, sic appellata sint. Inde ad abusionem ventum, ut usurpetur nomen[90] non rei similis sed quasi| vicinae. Quid enim simile habet significatio 'parvi' et 'minuti', cum possit par⟨v⟩um[91] esse quod non modo nihil / minutum sit, sed aliquid etiam creverit? Dicimus tamen propter quandam vicinitatem 'minutum' pro 'parvo'.| Sed haec abusio vocabuli in potestate loquentis est; habet enim 'parvum' ut 'minutum' non dicat[92]. Illud magis| pertinet ad id quod nunc volumus ostendere, quod, cum 'piscina' dicitur

78 eos urguere: eos arguere P eos urgere O eos surgere Q suggerere G. 79 interpretareris G*Crecelius*. 80 originem G. 81 *suppl. Hagen*. 82 dum DB quaerendam G dicenda est P faciendum *conj. Crecelius*. 83 ista BOQ. 84 auditam D audita P. 85 efficiunt $B^{ac}P$. 86 sentiantur $D^{pc}BOP$. 87 concordaret B concordet D. 88 duritiae BQ duritia G +et *codd. (secl. Crecelius)*. 89 crucis: *om.* DBPOQ. 90 *conj. Lovan. ex codice Carthusiano nondum reperto*: tamen *codd.* 91 parum DBPOQ. 92 dicatur POQG.

be easy to refute them by saying that this would be an infinite process, for by whichever words you interpret the origin of any one word, the origin of these words would in turn have to be sought, they assert that you must search until you arrive at some similarity of the sound of the word to the thing,[8] as when we say 'the clang of bronze,' 'the whinnying of horses,' 'the bleating of sheep,' 'the blare of trumpets,' 'the rattle of chains.' For you clearly see that these words sound like the things themselves which are signified by these words. But since there are things which do not make sounds, in these touch is the basis for similarity. If the things touch the sense smoothly or roughly, the smoothness or roughness of letters in like manner touches the hearing and thus has produced the names for them. For example, '*lene*' (smoothly) itself has a smooth sound. Likewise, who does not by the name itself judge '*asperitas*' (roughness) to be rough? It is gentle to the ears when we say '*voluptas*' (pleasure); it is harsh when we say '*crux*' (cross). Thus the words are perceived in the way the things themselves affect us. Just as honey itself affects the taste pleasantly, so its name, '*mel*,' affects the hearing smoothly. '*Acre*' (bitter) is harsh in both ways. Just as the words '*lana*' (wool) and '*vepres*' (brambles) are heard, so the things themselves are felt.[9] The Stoics believed that these cases where the impression made on the senses by the things is in harmony with the impression made on the senses by the sounds are, as it were, the cradle of words. From this point they believed that the license for naming had proceeded to the similarity of things themselves to each other. For example, take the words '*crux*' (cross) and '*crura*' (legs).[10] A *crux* is so called because the harshness of the word itself agrees with the harshness of the pain which the cross produces. On the other hand, *crura* are so called not on account of the harshness of pain but because their length and hardness as compared with the other members is more similar to the wood of the cross. Next we come to the transferred use of words, when a name is derived not from a similar thing but, as it were, from a nearby thing. For what is there similar between the signification of '*parvum*' (small) and the signification of '*minutum*' (diminutive), since something can be small which is in no way diminished but has even grown? Nevertheless we say '*minutum*' for '*parvum*' according to a certain proximity of signification. But this transferred use of a name is within the discretion of the speaker, for he has the word '*parvum*' and need not use '*minutum*.' This bears more on what I now wish to show, namely, that when '*piscina*' (fish-pond) is applied to

in balneis, in qua piscium nihil sit| nihilque simile piscibus habeat, videtur tamen a piscibus dicta[93] propter aquam, ubi piscibus vita est. Ita vocabulum non translatum similitudine sed quadam vicinitate usurpatum est[94]. Quod si| quis dicat homines piscibus similes natando fieri et inde
20 piscinae nomen esse natum, stultum est repugnare[95], / cum ab re neutrum abhorreat et utrumque lateat. Illud tamen bene accidit, quod hoc[96] uno exemplo diiudicare| iam possumus, quid distet[97] origo verbi quae de vicinitate adripitur ab ea quae de similitudine ducitur. Hinc| facta progressio usque ad contrarium. Nam 'lucus' eo dictus putatur quod minime luceat et 'bellum' quod| res bella non sit et 'foederis' nomen quod res foeda
[11] non sit. Quod si a foeditate porci dictum est, ut non/nulli volunt, redit origo[98] ad illam vicinitatem, cum id quod fit ab eo per quod fit nominatur. Nam ista| omnino vicinitas late patet et per multas partes secatur: aut per efficientiam, ut hoc ipsum a foeditate porci,| per quem 'foedus' efficiatur – aut per effecta[99], ut 'puteus', quod eius effectum[100] potatio est, creditur dictus –| aut per id quo[101] continetur[101a], ut 'urbem' ab orbe
5 appellatam volunt, quod auspicato locus[102] aratro circumduci[103] / solet, cuius rei et Vergilius[c] meminit, ubi "Aeneas urbem designat aratro" – aut| per id quod continet[104], ut si quis 'horreum' mutata[105] littera affirmet ab hordeo nominatum – aut per| abusionem, ut cum 'horreum' dicimus et ibi[106] triticum conditur – vel a parte totum, ut 'mucronis' nomine,| quae summa pars gladii est, gladium vocamus[107] – vel a toto pars, ut 'capillus' quasi capitis pilus. Quid| ultra provehar? Quidquid aliud adnumerari potest, aut similitudine rerum et sonorum aut simili-
10 tudine / rerum ipsarum aut vicinitate aut contrario contineri videbis originem verbi. Quam persequi non quidem| ultra soni similitudinem possumus, sed hoc non semper utique possumus. Innumerabilia sunt enim verba,| quorum origo[108], de qua[109] ratio reddi[110] possit, aut non est, ut ego arbitror, aut latet, ut Stoici contendunt.| Vide tamen paulu-

[c] Vergil, Aeneis V, 755.

93 dictam DBP. 94 Ita – est: *om. Crecelius errore.* 95 reputare Q refutare G. 96 *om.* QG. 97 quid distet: qui distet DBG^{ac} quid ista P. 98 ergo G. 99 effectum P^{pc}G. 100 effectus G. 101 quod OQG. 101a continet G. 102 loco G. 103 aratro circumduci: circumduci aratro OQG. 104 continetur G. 105 mutata: +d P^{pc}G. 106 ubi D. 107 vocant QG dicimus B. 108 *om.* QG. 109 de qua: *om.* G. atque *conj. Crecelius.* 110 reddi: +non *suppl. edd.*

baths, in which there are no fish and nothing like fish, the baths are, nevertheless, named from *pisces* (fish) because they contain water, in which fish live.[11] Thus the term is not applied by any similarity but is borrowed because of a certain proximity. But if someone should think that men are like fish because they swim and that the term '*piscina*' comes from this, it is foolish to oppose his theory, since neither explanation is incongruous with the thing and each is obscure. It is fortunate that we can see by means of one example the difference between the origin of a word which is drawn from proximity and the origin of a word which is derived from similarity. We can thus move on to contrariety. It is thought that a *lucus* (sacred grove) is so called because *minime luceat* (it has little light);[12] and *bellum* (war) because it is not *bella* (pretty); and that has the name '*foedus*' (alliance) which is not *foeda* (dishonorable). But if, as
[11] many think, *foedus* is named from *foeditas porci* (the filthiness of the pig), then its origin is based on the proximity we were talking about, since that which is made is named from that by which it is made.[13] Proximity is a broad notion which can be divided into many aspects: (1) from influence, as in the present instance in which an alliance is caused by the filthiness of the pig; (2) from effects, as *puteus* (a well) is named, it is believed, from its effect, *potatio* (drinking); (3) from that which contains, as *urbs* (city) is named from the *orbis* (circle) which was by ancient custom plowed around the area after taking auspices at the place (Vergil mentions where "Aeneas laid out the city by plowing");[14] (4) from that which is contained, as it is affirmed that by changing a letter *horreum* (granary) is named after *hordeum* (barley); (5) or by transference, as when we say '*horreum*' and yet it is *triticum* (wheat) that is preserved there; (6) or the whole from a part, as when we call a *gladium* (sword) by the name '*mucro*' (point), which is the terminating part of the sword; (7) or the part from the whole, as when a *capillus* (hair) is named from *capitis pilus* (hair of the head). How do I go beyond that? Whatever else is added you will see that the origin of a word is contained either in the similarity of things and sounds, in the similarity of things themselves, in proximity, or in contrariety.

We cannot pursue the origin of a word beyond a similarity of sound, and at times we are unable to do even this. For an explanation can be sought for innumerable words for which there either is no origin, as I believe, or for which it is hidden, as the Stoics maintain.[15] But now con-

lum, quomodo perveniri putant ad illa verborum cunabula vel stirpem potius atque adeo| sementum, ultra quod quaeri originem vetant nec si quisquam velit potest quicquam invenire. Nemo abnuit / syllabas, in quibus v littera locum obtinet consonantis, ut sunt in his verbis primae 'vafer, velum, vinum,| vomis, vulnus' crassum[111] et quasi validum sonum edere. Quod approbat etiam loquendi consuetudo, cum de| quibusdam verbis eas subtrahimus, ne onerent aurem. Nam unde[112] est, quod 'amasti' dicimus libentius quam| 'amavisti',[113] et 'abiit' non 'abivit' et in hunc modum innumerabilia. Ergo cum dicimus| 'vim', sonus verbi ut dictum est quasi validus[114] congruit rei quam significat. Iam ex illa vicinitate per id quod / efficiunt, hoc est quia[115] violenta sunt, dicta 'vincula' [12] possunt videri et 'vimen' quo aliquid vinciatur. Inde[116] / 'vites', quod adminicula quibus innituntur[117] nexibus prendunt[118]. Hinc iam propter similitudinem incurvum senem| 'vietum' Terentius[D] appellavit. Hinc terra, quae pedibus itinerantium flexuosa et trita est,| 'via' dicitur. Si autem 'via', quod vi pedum trita est, magis[119] creditur dicta, redit origo ad illam vicinitatem.| Sed faciamus a similitudine vitis vel viminis hoc est a flexu esse dictam. Quaerit ergo[120] me quispiam: quare / 'via' dicta est? respondeo: a flexu, quod flexum velut incurvum 'vietum' veteres dixerunt, unde 'vietos' |etiam[121] quae[122] cantho[123] ambiantur rotarum ligna vocant. Persequitur quaerere, unde 'vietum' flexum dicatur: et| hic respondeo a similitudine vitis. Instat atque exigit, unde ita[124] sit 'vitis' nomen; dico, quod vinciat ea quae| comprehenderit. Scrutatur, ipsum 'vincire' unde dictum sit; dicemus a vi. 'Vis' quare sic appellatur, requiret;| reddetur ratio, quod robusto et quasi valido sono verbum rei quam significat congruit. Ultra quod requirat / non habet. Quot modis autem origo verborum corruptione vocum varietur, ineptum est persequi. Nam et| longum et minus quam illa quae dicta sunt necessarium.|

[D] Terentius, Eunuchus IV, 4, 21.

111 grassum DQ grossum G. 112 inde PG$^{s.l.}$. 113 amavisti: +et nosti quam novisti D. 114 validius DBPOQ. 115 qui Q quod O. 116 unde O nd G. 117 innitantur QG^{ac}. 118 *om.* Q prendent G pendent *edd.* 119 *om.* QG. 120 ergo: +a *edd.* 121 *om.* QG. 122 quod OQG. 123 *conj. Crecelius*: canthu O cantu DBPQG. 124 ista Q istud G.

sider for a moment the way in which the Stoics think they arrive at that cradle or root of words, or more precisely the seed of words, beyond which they deny that the origin can be sought or that anything can be found even if someone wishes to search. No one denies that syllables in which the letter 'v' functions as a consonant produce a dense and powerful kind of sound, for example, in the first syllable of the words '*vafer*,' '*velum*,' '*vinum*,' '*vomis*,' '*vulnus*.'[16] Thus ordinary usage approves our removing this sound from certain words lest they oppress the ear. For this reason we say '*amasti*' more readily than '*amavisti*' and '*abiit*' not '*abivit*.' There are innumerable examples of this. Therefore when we say '*vis*' (force), the sound of the word is, as I said, in a way powerful, congruous with the thing signified. We can see that chains are called '*vincula*' from a proximity with that which they do, that is, because they are *violenta* (forcible) and that a *vimen* (withe) is so called because by it something is [12] *vinciatur* (bound). In the same way, *vites* (vines) are so named because they seize the stakes which they press upon by entwining.[17] On account of this Terence called a bent old man '*vietum*' (withered) by similarity.[18] And the ground which is winding and worn by the feet of travelers is called '*via*' (road). If it is thought to be called '*via*' more because it is worn by the *vis* (force) of feet, then the origin of the word returns to the realm of proximity. But let us derive it from a likeness to a vine or a withe, that is, from its winding; then if someone were to ask me why it is called '*via*,' I would answer, from winding, because the ancients called what is wound or bent '*vietus*' (withered). For this reason they called the woods of wheels which are encircled by iron '*vieti*.' Then another question arises. Why is something bent called '*vietus*'? And to this[19] I answer, from the similarity to *vites* (vines). This raises the question why a *vitis* has this name and I say that it is because it *vincit* (binds) that which it lays hold of. If it is asked why '*vincire*' itself is thus spoken, we say, from '*vis*.' If it is asked again why it is called '*vis*,' the reason can be given that the word, with its robust and powerful sound, is congruent with the thing that is signified. No further explanation is required. But it is useless to inquire about the number of ways in which the origin of words is varied by the alteration of utterances, for such an inquiry is long and it is not as crucial as these matters of which we have spoken.

VII

Nunc vim verborum, quantum res patet, breviter consideremus. Vis verbi est, qua cognoscitur quan|tum valeat. Valet autem tantum quantum movere audientem[125] potest. Porro movet audientem aut secundum se| aut secundum id quod significat aut ex utroque communiter. Sed cum secun-
15 dum se movet, aut ad solum / sensum pertinet aut ad artem aut ad utrumque. Sensus aut natura movetur aut consuetudine. Natura movetur[126] |cum[127] offenditur, si quis nominet Artaxerxen regem, vel mulcetur, cum audit Euryalum. Quis| enim etiamsi nihil umquam de his[128] hominibus audierit, quorum ista sint[129] nomina, non tamen et[130] in illo asperi|tatem maximam et in hoc iudicet esse lenitatem? Consuetudine movetur sensus, cum offenditur, si[131] quis verbi| causa vocetur 'Motta', et non offenditur[131], cum audit 'Cottam'[132]. Nam hic ad soni suavitatem
20 vel insuavitatem / nihil interest, sed tantum valent aurium penetralia[133], utrum per se transeuntes sonos quasi hospites notos an| ignotos recipiant. Arte autem movetur auditor, cum enuntiato sibi verbo attendit, quae sit
[13] pars orationis, vel / si quid aliud in his disciplinis quae de verbis traduntur accepit. At vero ex utroque id est et sensu et arte| de verbo iudicatur, cum id, quod aures metiuntur, ratio notat et nomen ita ponit[134], ut, cum[135] dicitur[136] 'optimus',| mox, ut aurem longa una syllaba et duae breves huiusce nominis percusserint, animus ex arte statim pedem| dactylum agnoscit[137]. Iam[138] vero non secundum se, sed secundum id quod
5 significat verbum movet, quando per / verbum[139] accepto signo animus nihil aliud quam rem ipsam intuetur, cuius illud signum est quod accepit: ut| cum Augustino nominato nihil aliud quam ego ipse cogitor ab eo cui notus sum, aut quilibet[140] hominum menti| occurit[141], si forte hoc nomen vel qui me ignorat audierit, vel qui alium novit qui Augustinus vocetur. Cum| autem simul et secundum se verbum movet audientem et secundum id quod significat, tunc et ipsa enuntiatio| et id quod ab ea[142] nun-

125 movere audientem: audientem movere OQG. 126 movetur *conj. Hagen*: vitiavit DBP vitiabit Q vitiatur G *om.* O iudicabit *conj. Crecelius*. 127 quod Q in eo quod G. 128 iis D. 129 sunt BG sicut Q. 130 *om.* QG. 131 si – offenditur: *om.* BPOQG. 132 Cotta DBP quoddam Q quiddam G. 133 sed tantum (tamen G) valet, aurium penetralia utrum *maluit Hagen*. 134 ponitur P^{pc}OG. 135 *om.* QG. 136 dicimur G. 137 agnoscat *conj. Crecelius*. 138 Iam *conj. Crecelius*: scientiam DBPQ scientia OG sensum *conj. edd.* 139 urbem DBP aurem *conj. Crecelius*. 140 quilibet *conj. Ben.*: cuilibet *codd.* 141 menti occurrit: mentio currit DB. 142 eo G.

CHAPTER VII. THE FORCE OF WORDS

Now we shall consider, as briefly as the matter allows, the force of words. The force of a word is that whereby the extent of its efficacy is learned. It has efficacy to the extent to which it is able to affect a hearer. Now a word affects a hearer either on its own account or on account of what it signifies or on account of both together.[1]

When a word affects a hearer on its own account, it does so either by sense alone or by art or by both. Sense is affected either by nature or by custom.[2] Sense is affected by nature when, for example, it is offended if someone names King Artaxerxes or is soothed when it hears 'Euryalus.' For who, even though he has heard nothing about the men who are named, will not suppose that there is great harshness in the former and mildness in the latter?[3] Sense is affected by custom when, for example, it is offended if someone is named 'Motta' and not offended when it hears 'Cotta.'[4] This has nothing to do with the smoothness or roughness of sound, but rather with the extent to which the passing sounds themselves are received by the inner chambers of the ears as familiar guests or as strangers. The hearer is affected by art when he
[13] considers the part of speech of a word spoken to him or undertakes some other investigation belonging to those disciplines that are devoted to words. And the hearer is affected by both, that is the word is judged by sense and art, whenever reason takes note of what the ears take the measure of and a name is thus supplied. For example, if someone says '*optimus*,' as soon as the one long and the two short syllables of this word strike the ear, the mind by art immediately recognizes a dactylic foot.

A word affects sense on account of what it signifies rather than on its own account when the mind receives a sign by a word and considers nothing other than the thing itself whose sign has been received. Suppose, for example, that Augustine has been named and a man to whom I am known thinks of nothing except I myself, or another man comes to mind if this name happens to be heard by someone who does not know me but knows another man called 'Augustine.'[5]

When, however, a word moves a hearer both on its own account and on account of what it signifies, then both the statement itself and that

tiatur[143] simul advertitur. Unde enim[144], quod non offenditur aurium
10 castitas, cum[145] audit[E] / manu ventre pene[146] bona patria laceraverat? Offenderetur autem, si obscena pars| corporis sordido ac vulgari nomine appellaretur, cum res eadem sit cuius utrumque vocabulum est, nisi quod| in[147] illo turpitudo rei quae significata est decore verbi significantis[148] operitur[149], in hoc autem sensum animumque| utriusque deformitas fer⟨i⟩ret[150]: veluti non alia[151] meretrix, sed aliter tamen videtur eo cultu, quo ante iudicem stare| adsolet, aliter eo quo in luxuriosi cubiculo
15 iacere[151a]. Cum igitur tantam vim tamque multiplicem appareat esse / verborum, quam breviter pro tempore summatimque attigimus, duplex hinc[152] ex consideratione[153] sensus nascitur: partim| propter explicandam veritatem, partim propter conservandum decorem; quorum primum ad dialecticum, secundum| ad oratorem maxime pertinet. Quamvis enim nec disputationem deceat ineptam[154] nec eloquentiam oporteat[155] esse men|dacem, tamen et in illa saepe, atque adeo paene semper, audiendi delicias discendi cupido contemnit et in hac imperitior| multitudo quod ornate dicitur etiam vere dici arbitratur. Ergo cum appareat, quid sit
20 uniuscuiusque proprium, mani/festum est et disputatorem, si qua ei
[14] delectandi cura est, rhetorico colore aspergendum, et oratorem, si veri- / tatem persuadere vult, dialecticis quasi nervis atque ossibus esse roborandum, quae ipsa natura in[156] corporibus| nostris nec firmitati[157] virium subtrahere potuit nec oculorum offensioni[158] patere permisit.|

VIII

Itaque nunc propter veritatem diiudicandam, quod dialectica profitetur, ex hac verborum vi, cuius| quaedam semina sparsimus, quae impedimen-
5 ta nascantur, videamus. Impedit enim auditorem ad veritatem[159] / videndam in verbis aut obscuritas aut ambiguitas. Inter ambiguum et obscurum[160] hoc interest, quod in| ambiguo plura se ostendunt, quorum

[E] Sallust, Catilina 14, 2.

143 enuntiatur G. 144 enim: *om.* B +fit G +est P^{pc} *Crecelius*. 145 quod OQ. 146 pone DB paene Q pede $P^{pc}G^{pc}$. 147 *om.* BPOQ. 148 significanti $DBP^{ac}Q$. 149 operiretur G oritur Q. 150 feriret *conj. Crecelius*: ferret DBOQ offenderet GP(*super rasuram*). 151 aria DBPO. 151a *conj. Hagen*: iaceret *codd.* 152 hic QG. 153 ex consideratione: consideratio *conj. Crecelius*. 154 incomptam *conj. Hagen*. 155 oportet DBP^{ac}. 156 *om.* G. 157 firmitate G. 158 offensionem DBOQ offensioni $P^{pc}G$ offensione *conj. Crecelius*. 159 varietatem $DBP^{ac}G^{pc}$. 160 ambiguum et obscurum: obscurum et ambiguum OG.

which is stated by means of it are attended to together. Why is the chastity of the ears not offended when one hears "He had squandered his patrimony by hand, by belly, and by penis"?[6] It would be offended if the private part of the body were called by a low or vulgar name, though the thing with a different name is the same. If the shamefulness of the thing signified were not covered over by the propriety of the signifying word, then the base character of both would affect both sense and mind. Similarly, although a harlot *is* no different, she nevertheless looks different because of the clothes she wears when she stands before a judge than she looks when she lies in her dissolute bedchamber.

Thus since the force of words appears to be as complicated as our treatment of it has been brief and cursory, our reflections give rise to two ways of looking at the subject: partly through presenting truth, partly through observing propriety. The first of these is the concern of the dialectician, the second mainly of the orator. For although disputation need not be inelegant and eloquence need not be deceptive, still in the former the passion of learning often – indeed, nearly always – scorns the pleasures of hearing, while in the latter the more ignorant multitude think that what is said elegantly is said truly. Therefore, when it becomes apparent what is proper to each, it is clear that a disputer who has any concern to make his points appealing will sprinkle them with rhetorical color, and an
[14] orator who wishes to convince people of the truth will be strengthened by the sinews and bones, as it were, of dialectic, which are indispensable to the strength of the body but are not allowed to become visible to the eye.[7]

CHAPTER VIII. OBSCURITY AND AMBIGUITY[1]

Because the business of dialectic is to discern the truth, let us look now at the hindrances which may arise because of the force of words – a matter about which we have just now made some scattered remarks. Either obscurity or ambiguity hinders the hearer from discerning the truth in words. The difference between what is ambiguous and what is obscure is this: in what is ambiguous more than one thing is presented,

quid potius accipiendum sit ignoratur, in obscuro autem nihil aut parum| quod attendatur apparet. Sed ubi parum est quod apparet, obscurum est ambiguo simile: veluti si quis| ingrediens iter excipiatur aliquo bivio vel trivio vel etiam ut ita dicam multivio loco, ibique[161] densitate nebulae| nihil viarum quod est eluceat. Ergo a pergendo prius obscuritate terretur[162]; at ubi aliquantum[163] rarescere nebulae / coeperint, videtur aliquid, quod utrum via sit an terrae proprius et[163a] nitidior color incertum est. Hoc est obscurum ambiguo simile[164]. Dilucescente| autem[165] caelo quantum oculis satis sit iam omnium viarum deductio clara est, sed qua sit pergendum non| obscuritate sed ambiguitate dubitatur. Item sunt obscurorum genera tria. Unum est quod sensui patet,| animo clausum est: tamquam si quis malum punicum pictum videat, qui neque viderit aliquando nec| omnino quale esset audierit, non oculorum est, sed animi, quod cuius rei pictura sit nescit. Alterum / genus est, ubi res animo pateret, nisi sensui clauderetur: sicuti est homo pictus[166] in tenebris. Nam ubi oculis| apparuerit, nihil animus hominem pictum[167] esse dubitabit[168]. Tertium genus est, in quo etiam sensui absconditur,| quod tamen si nudaretur nihilo magis animo emineret, quod genus est omnium obscurissimum: ut si imperitus| malum illud punicum pictum etiam in tenebris cogeretur agnoscere.|

Refer[169] nunc animum ad verba, quorum sunt istae[170] similitudines. Constitue[171] animo[172] quempiam grammaticum / convocatis discipulis factoque silentio suppressa voce dixisse 'temetum', quod ab eo dictum qui prope adsi|debant satis audierunt, qui remotius parum, qui autem remotissime nulla omnino voce perstricti sunt. Horum[173]| autem illi ⟨qui prope adsidebant, quid esset 'temetum' ignorabant, illi autem⟩[174] qui remotiores erant nescio quo casu partim sciebant, quid esset temetum, partim ignorabant; illos| vero, qui magistri vocem nec[175] acceperant, quid esset temetum prorsus latebat; omnes obscuritate impediebantur.| Et hic iam perspicis omnia illa[176] genera obscuritatum. Nam qui de[177] auditu nihil dubitabant, primum illud / genus patiebantur, cui simile est malum punicum ignorantibus sed in luce pictum. Qui noverant

161 ubique Q ubi POG. 162 tenetur QG. 163 aliquantulum P aliquanto OG aliquando Q. 163a sed *conj. Hagen.* 164 Hoc – simile: *om. Crecelius errore.* 165 *om.* QG. 166 vinctus QG. 167 vinctum QG. 168 dubitavit DQ. 169 refert DB. 170 sunt istae: istae sunt OG. 171 constitutae QG. 172 pone QG. 173 *hic deest unum folium in D (usque ad n. 201). Ubi D deficit* d *adhibemus.* 174 *suppl. Hagen.* 175 ne dBOP bene *conj. Crecelius.* 176 Illa: +tria QG. 177 *om. G.*

but one does not know which of them is to be understood; in what is obscure, on the other hand, nothing or very little appears to be considered. When a little appears, obscurity is similar to ambiguity, as when someone who is walking on a road comes upon a junction with two, three, or even more forks of the road, but can see none of them on account of the thickness of a fog. Thus at first he is kept from proceeding by obscurity. When the fog begins to lift a bit, something can be seen, but it is uncertain whether there is any road or any of the bright colors typical of the earth. This is obscurity similar to ambiguity. When the sky clears enough for good visibility, the direction of all the roads is apparent, but which is to be taken is still in doubt, not because of any obscurity but solely because of ambiguity.[2]

There are three kinds of obscurity. The first is when something is manifest to the senses but is closed to the mind, as, for example, if someone sees a picture of a red apple, who has never seen an apple or heard what it is; his failure to know what it is a picture of is due not to his eyes but to his mind. There is another kind of obscurity when the thing would be manifest to the mind if it were not closed to the senses, as in the case of a picture of a man which is in the dark; for as soon as it is visible to the eyes the mind will in no way doubt that a man is pictured. There is a third kind of obscurity, the most obscure of all three, when something is hidden to the senses and even if it were to be revealed nothing more would be clear to the mind, as when a man with no knowledge of apples tries to recognize a picture of an apple in the dark.

Now turn your attention to words, of which these are likenesses. Imagine a teacher of grammar who, when he had called his class together and gotten silence, said in a low voice, '*temetum*' (wine).[3] Those who were seated nearby heard what he said quite distinctly; those who were some distance from him caught something of it; and those who were farthest from him heard no sound at all. Of these three groups, those who sat near him did not know what *temetum* is;[4] those who were further from him in some cases knew and in other cases, for some reason, did not know what *temetum* is; and those who did not hear his voice at all were utterly ignorant of what *temetum* is. All three groups were hindered by obscurity. And here you see all three kinds of obscurity. For those who had no doubt about what they heard experienced that first kind of obscurity which is similar to the case of those who saw the picture in the light and

verbum sed| auribus aut parum aut omnino non acceperant vocem, secundo illo genere laborabant, cui similis est hominis| imago sed in non[178] perspicuo aut omnino tenebricoso[179] loco. Qui autem non solum vocis sed et significationis| verbi expertes erant, tertii generis, quod omnium
[15] taeterrimum[180] est, caecitate involvebantur. Quod[181] autem dictum / est[182] quiddam obscurum ambiguo simile, in his perspici potest, quibus verbum erat quidem[183] notum sed vocem| nec penitus nullam nec omnino certam perceperant. Omnia igitur obscure loquendi genera vitabit[184], qui et| voce quantum satis est clara nec ore impedita[184a] et verbis notissimis utetur. Vide nunc in eodem grammatici| exemplo, quam longe aliter[185] impediat ambiguitas quam obscuritas verbi. Fac enim eos qui
5 aderant et satis / sensu accepisse vocem magistri et illum id[186] verbum enuntiasse quod esset omnibus notum, ut puta fac eum| dixisse 'magnus' et deinde siluisse. Attende, quae incerta[187] hoc audito nomine patiantur. Quid si enim[188] dicturus est| 'quae pars orationis'? quid si de metris quaesiturus 'qui[189] sit pes'? quid si de[190] historia[191] rogaturus[192] ut puta 'magnus| Pompeius quot bella gesserit'? quid si commendandorum carminum gratia[193] dicturus est 'magnus et| paene solus poeta Vergilius'?
10 quid si obiurgaturus neglegentiam discipulorum in haec deinde verba / prorumpet[194] 'magnus vos erga studia[195] torpor invasit'? videsne remota nebula obscuritatis illud quod| supra dictum est quasi eminuisse multivium? nam hoc unum quod dictum est 'magnus' et nomen est et pes| chorius est et Pompeius est et Vergilius et neglegentiae torpor et si qua alia vel[196] innumerabilia non com|memorata sunt, quae tamen per hanc enuntiationem verbi possunt intellegi.|

IX

Itaque rectissime a dialecticis dictum est ambiguum esse omne verbum.
15 Nec moveat quod apud Cice/ronem calumniatur Hortensius hoc modo "ambigua se[197] aiunt audere[198] explicare dilucide. Idem[199] omne| ver-

178 in non: non in OG non Q. 179 tenebroso OQG. 180 deterrimum G. 181 quid dBP^{sc} cum Q. 182 esse dB. 183 quidem: +non *suppl. Hagen.* 184 vitavit dBP. 184a impedito dBPO. 185 aliud QG. 186 illum id: illud id Q illud G. 187 quae incerta: qui incerta Q quid incerti G. 188 eum Q *om.* G. 189 quid dP. 190 *om.* QG. 191 historiam G. 192 interrogaturus G. 193 grama Q grammaticus G. 194 prorumpat QG. 195 studium G. 196 qua alia vel: qua alia P qualia dB. 197 ambigua se: ambiguose G. 198 audere *conj. Erasmus, Crecelius*: audire acute *codd.* 199 id est P^{pc}O *om.* G.

had no knowledge of a red apple. Those who knew the word but heard a little of the utterance or none at all labored under the second kind of obscurity, as in the example of the man's portrait hung in a shadowy or completely dark place. But those who not only failed to hear the utterance but were ignorant of the signification of the word are enveloped in the blindness of the third kind, which is the worst of all three. What we
[15] have called obscurity similar to ambiguity can be clearly seen in those to whom the word was indeed known but who did not apprehend the utterance entirely, or at least with any certainty. Therefore one who speaks in a loud enough voice, with good articulation, and using the best known words, will avoid all the varieties of speaking obscurely.

Notice now in the same example of the teacher of grammar how the ambiguity of a word hinders in a way very different from obscurity. Suppose that those who were with him heard the teacher's voice clearly and that he spoke a word known to everyone. For example, suppose he said '*magnus*' (great) and then was silent. Notice the uncertainties that result from hearing the name. For what if he were going to say, 'What part of speech is it?' What if he were going to ask about its meter, 'What sort of foot is it?' What if he were going to raise a historical question, for example, 'Great Pompey, how many wars did he wage?'[5] What if he were going to say for the sake of commending some poems, 'Great and almost unique is the poet Vergil?' What if he were going to scold the negligence of the students, blurting out, 'Great laziness toward studies has come upon you!' Do you see that when the fog of obscurity is removed, the word which was spoken above is like a crossroads with many paths? For the one thing that is said – '*magnus*' – is a name and a chorius and Pompey and Vergil and the laziness of negligence. And innumerable other things, even though not mentioned here, can also be understood as a result of this utterance of the word.

CHAPTER IX. AMBIGUITY[1]

Therefore it is said quite correctly by the dialecticians that every word is ambiguous.[2] It is beside the point when Hortensius in Cicero misrepresents them in this way: "They say that they listen for ambiguous words in order to explain them clearly; and yet they say that every word is

bum ambiguum esse dicunt. Quomodo igitur ambigua ambiguis explicabunt? Nam hoc est in tenebras extinctum lumen inferre.'[F] Facete[200] quidem atque callide dictum, sed hoc est quod apud eundem Ciceronem Scaevola dicit Antonio[G] "denique ut sapientibus diserte, stultis etiam vere videaris dicere." Quid enim aliud illo loco fecit Hortensius nisi
20 acumine ingenii et / lepore sermonis quasi meraco[201] et suavi poculo
[16] imperitis caliginem obfudit? Quod enim dictum est omne verbum / esse ambiguum de verbis singulis dictum est. Explicantur autem ambigua disputando et nemo utique verbis singulis disputat. Nemo igitur ambigua verba verbis ambiguis explicabit. Et tamen cum omne verbum ambiguum sit, nemo verborum[202] ambiguitatem[203] nisi verbis sed iam[204] coniunctis quae ambigua non erunt explicabit. Ut enim, si dicerem[205] 'omnis miles bipes est', non ex eo sequeretur, ut cohors ex militibus utique[206] bipedi-
5 bus ita[207] / constaret[208], ita, cum dico ambiguum esse omne verbum, non dico sententiam, non disputationem, quamvis verbis ista texantur. Omne igitur ambiguum verbum non ambigua disputatione explicabitur.

Nunc ambiguitatum genera videamus; quae prima duo sunt, unum in his etiam quae dicuntur, alterum quod in his solis quae scribuntur dubitationem facit. Nam et[209] si quis audierit 'acies' et si quis legerit, potest incertum habere, nisi per sententiam clarescat, utrum acies militum an
10 ferri an oculorum dicta vel scripta sit. / At vero si quis inveniat scriptum verbi causa 'leporem' nec appareat qua sententia positum sit, profecto dubitabit, utrum paenultima huius verbi syllaba producenda sit ab eo quod est 'lepos' an ab eo quod est 'lepus' corripienda – quam scilicet non pateretur ambagionem[210], si accusativum huius nominis casum voce loquentis acciperet. Quod si quis dicat etiam loquentem male pronuntiare potuisse, iam non ambiguitate sed obscuritate impediretur auditor ex illo tamen genere quod ambiguo simile est, quia male latine pronun-
15 tiatum verbum / non in diversas notiones[211] trahit cogitantem sed ad id quod apparet impellit. Cum igitur duo ista genera inter se plurimum distent, primum genus rursus in duo dividitur. Nam quidquid dicitur et

[F] Cicero, Hortensius frg. [G] Cicero, De oratore I, 10, 44.

200 facete: facile QG (*s.l.add.* vel facete G) facie dBP^{ac} (facete P^{pc}). 201 *Hic iterum incipit* D. 202 verbum G. 203 ambiguum G. 204 etiam OG. 205 diceret G. 206 *om.* G. 207 ista DBPO tota *conj. Lovan.* 208 constarent DP. 209 *om.* G. 210 ambaginem D ambagem G. 211 nationes B rationes POQG.

ambiguous. How will they explain ambiguities by ambiguities? This is like bringing an unlighted lamp into the darkness."[3] Indeed, this is wittily and skillfully said, but this is what Scaevola says to Antony, also in Cicero: "Lastly, you should seem to speak clearly to the wise and truly to the ignorant as well."[4] For in that other passage what does Hortensius do except pour obscurity into a pure and sweet cup for the uninstructed by means of the sharpness of his genius and the charm of his speech? For when it is said that every word is ambiguous, it is said of isolated
[16] words. But ambiguities are explained through discussion and certainly no one carries on a discussion by means of isolated words. Thus no one explains ambiguous words by ambiguous words; and although every word is ambiguous, no one will explain the ambiguity of words except by means of words, but words already combined which will not be ambiguous. For if I were to say, 'Every soldier is two-footed,' it would not follow from this that a platoon made up of two-footed soldiers would itself be two-footed. So when I say that every word is ambiguous, I do not say that every statement or every discussion [is ambiguous], although these are built of words. Every ambiguous word will, therefore, be explained by non-ambiguous discussion.

Now let us look at the kinds of ambiguity. First, these two: one produces doubt even in spoken expressions, the other only in those that are written. For whether one hears 'point' or reads it, he might be uncertain whether the point of a military formation or of a sword or of vision is spoken or written about unless it is made clear by a statement in which it occurs.[5] And if someone comes upon the written word '*leporem*,' for example, and it is not apparent in which sentence[6] it was located, he will be uncertain whether the penultimate syllable of the word is to be drawn out as a form of '*lepos*' (wit) or whether it is to be shortened as a form of '*lepus*' (hare). There would not be this degree of ambiguity if he had heard the accusative case of this name in the voice of a speaker. But if someone says that even a speaker can pronounce badly what he says, then the hearer is hindered not by ambiguity but by obscurity. Yet it is the kind of obscurity which is similar to ambiguity, because the word pronounced badly in Latin does not lead a thinker to different ideas but forces him to that which he thinks he heard.

Since these two kinds of ambiguity differ very greatly from each other, the first kind [that is, about what is said,] is again divided into two. For

per plura intellegi potest,| eadem scilicet plura aut non[212] solum vocabulo uno sed una etiam definitione contineri queunt aut tantum com|muni tenentur vocabulo[212] sed diversis expeditionibus explicantur. Ea quae una definitio potest includere[213] 'univoca'| nominantur, illis autem quae sub uno nomine necesse est diverse definiri[214] 'aequivocis'[215] no-
20 men est. Prius ergo / consideremus univoca, ut, quoniam genus hoc iam definitione patefactum est, illustrentur[215a] exemplis. Hominem| cum dicimus, tam puerum dicimus quam iuvenem, quam senem, tam stultum quam sapientem, tam magnum| quam parvum, tam civem quam peregrinum, tam urbanum quam agrestem, tam qui iam fuit quam qui nunc| est, tam sedentem quam stantem, tam divitem quam pauperem, tam agentem aliquid quam cessantem, tam| gaudentem quam maerentem vel neutrum.
25 Sed in his omnibus dictionibus nihil est, quod non ut hominis / nomen accepit ita etiam hominis definitione claudatur. Nam definitio hominis
[17] est 'animal rationale / mortale'. Num[216] ergo quisquam potest dicere animal rationale mortale iuvenem tantum, non etiam puerum| aut senem esse[217], aut sapientem tantum, non etiam stultum? immo et ista et cetera quae numerata sunt sicut| hominis nomine ita etiam definitione continentur. Nam sive puer sive stultus sive pauper sive etiam dormiens,| si animal rationale mortale non est, nec homo est; est autem homo; illa
5 igitur etiam[218] definitione contineatur / necesse est. Et de ceteris quidem nihil ambigetur. De puero autem parvo aut stulto seu prorsus fatuo aut de| dormiente vel ebrio vel furente dubitari[219] potest, quomodo possint[220] esse animalia rationalia[221]. Potest omnino de|fendi, sed ad alia properantibus longum est. Ad id quod agitur illud satis: non esse istam[222] definitionem hominis| rectam et ratam, nisi et omnis homo eadem contineatur et praeter hominem nihil. Haec sunt igitur univoca,| quae non solum nomine uno sed una etiam eiusdem nominis definitione claudan-
10 tur[223], quamvis et inter se pro/priis nominibus et definitionibus distingui possint[224]. Diversa enim nomina puer, adulescens, dives, et pauper, liber,| et servus, et si quid aliud differentiarum est; ideo diversas[225] inter

212 non-vocabulo: non solum vocabulo uno Q (*per homoioteleuton*) uno vocabulo et una interpretatione aut tantum uno v. G. 213 potest includere: est includere DB includit P. 214 diverse definiri: definiri diverse OG. 215 aequivoci G. 215a illustretur BO. 216 non G. 217 puerum – esse: senem aut puerum et cetera G. 218 *om.* G. 219 dubitare QG^{ac}. 220 sint P possunt G. 221 rationabilia OG. 222 ista DB. 223 clauduntur G. 224 possunt G. 225 diversas: et G.

whenever something is said and can be understood in more than one way, these ways can either be included in a single name and a single definition or they are held together only by a name but are separated out by means of definitions. Those which one definition can include are called 'univocal,' but the name for those which must be variously defined under a single name is 'equivocal.'[7] First, we shall consider univocals, and since this kind is already clear from the definition, they will be illustrated by examples. When we speak of a man we speak equally of a boy and of a young man and of an old man, equally of a fool and of a wise man, equally of someone large and of someone small, of a citizen and a foreigner, of a city-dweller and a country-dweller, of one who was and of one who now is, of someone sitting and of someone standing, of a plutocrat and a pauper, of one doing something and of one doing nothing, of one who rejoices and of one who mourns and of one who does neither. Among all these expressions[8] there is not one which does not accept the name 'man' in such a way as to be included by the definition of man.
[17] For the definition of 'man' is 'a rational, mortal animal.'[9] Can anyone say that only a youth is a rational, mortal animal and not also a boy or an old man, or that only a wise man is and not also a fool? On the contrary, all these and the others which were listed above are contained in the name of man in such a way as to be contained in the definition as well. For whether it is a boy or a fool or a pauper or even someone sleeping, if it is not a rational, mortal animal, it is not a man; but it is a man. Therefore it is necessarily contained in that definition. And about the others mentioned there should be no doubt. One may wonder how a boy who is small and stupid, or at least silly, or a man who is sleeping or drunk or in a rage, can be rational animals. This can certainly be defended, but it would take too long to do this because we must hasten on to other subjects. For the matter at hand it is enough to say that the definition of 'man' is correct and certain only if it includes every man and nothing beyond men. Therefore univocals are those which are included not only in one name but also in a single definition of that name, even though they can be distinguished among themselves by their own special names and definitions. For these names are different, 'boy,' 'youth,' 'plutocrat'[10] and 'pauper,' 'slave' and 'freeman,' and, if there are such, [the names for] other differences. Thus they have special definitions different from one

se proprias definitiones habent[226]. Sed ut illis| unum commune nomen est homo, sic et[227] animal rationale mortale definitio una communis est.|

X

Nunc aequivoca videamus, in quibus[228] ambiguitatum perplexio prope infinita silvescit. Conabor tamen| eas in genera certa distinguere. Utrum autem conatum meum facultas sequatur, tu iudicabis. Ambiguitatum / igitur quae ab aequivocis veniunt prima genera tria sunt: unum ab arte, alterum ab usu, tertium ab utroque.| Artem nunc dico propter nomina, quae in verborum disciplinis verbis imponuntur. Aliter enim definitur apud| grammaticos, quid sit⟨nomen, aliter quid sit pes dactylus, aliter quid sit⟩[229] aequivocum[230]. Et tamen unum hoc[231] quod dico 'Tullius' et nomen| est et pes dactylus et aequivocum. Itaque si quis ex me efflagitet ut definiam quid sit 'Tullius', cuiuslibet| notionis explicatione respondeo? Possum enim recte dicere: Tullius est nomen, quo[232] significatur homo, summus / quidam orator, qui Catilinae coniurationem consul oppressit. Subtiliter attende me nomen ipsum definisse.| Nam si mihi Tullius ipse ille, qui si viveret digito demonstrari posset, definiendus foret, non dicerem: Tullius| est nomen, quo[233] significatur homo; sed dicerem: Tullius est homo et ita cetera adiungerem. Item respondere| possem hoc modo: Tullius est pes dactylus his litteris constans – quid enim nunc opus est eas litteras| enumerare[234]? Licet etiam illud dicere: Tullius est verbum, per quod aequivoca inter se sunt[235] omnia[236] cum hoc ipso / quae supra dicta sunt et si quid aliud inveniri potest. Cum igitur hoc unum quod dixi 'Tullius' secundum| artium vocabula tam varie mihi definire licuerit[237], quid dubitamus esse ambiguorum genus ex aequivocis| venientium, quod merito dici possit ex arte contingere? Diximus enim aequivoca esse, quae non ut uno| nomine ita etiam una definitione possunt teneri. Vide nunc alterum genus[238], quod ex loquendi usu venire| memoravimus. Usum nunc appello illud ipsum propter quod verba cognoscimus. Quis enim verba propter / verba conquirat et colligat? Itaque iam constitue

226 habebunt G. 227 *om.* G. 228 in quibus: *om.* DBP. 229 *supplevi.* 230 aequivocum: +aliter apud dialecticum *suppl. Lovan. codicem Carthusianum nondum repertum secuti.* 231 unum hoc: hoc unum G. 232 quod DQ. 233 quod DQ. 234 opus – enumerare: eas litteras opus est numerare OG. 235 aequivoca – sunt: aequivocantur inter se G. 236 nomina P. 237 licuit G. 238 genus: +est G.

another. But just as the one name 'man' is common to them, so the definition 'rational, mortal animal' is common to them.

CHAPTER X. EQUIVOCATION[1]

Now let us look at equivocals, in which the tangle of ambiguities runs wild, almost without limits. Nevertheless I shall attempt to sort them into definite kinds and you may judge whether my attempt succeeds.[2]

There are three main kinds of ambiguity that are based on equivocals. One is from art, another from use, and a third from both of these together. I say art because of the names which are imposed upon words by the disciplines dealing with words.[3] For grammarians define a word in one way when they say that it is a name, in another way when they say it is a dactylic foot, and in another way when they say that it is an equivocal. This one word which I speak, 'Tullius,' is both a name and a dactylic foot and an equivocal. Hence if someone asks me to define 'Tullius,' I may reply with an explication of one or another of these notions. I can correctly say that 'Tullius' is a name by which a man is signified, the greatest orator, who as consul overcame the conspiracy of Catiline.[4] Observe carefully that I have defined the name itself. For if one had demanded of me that I define Tullius himself, to whom I would be able to point with my finger if he were living, I would not say that Tullius is a name by which a man is signified, but I would say that Tullius is a man, and then I would add other things in that fashion. I could also say that 'Tullius' is a dactylic foot consisting in these sounds – is it necessary to enumerate them? It is also possible to say that 'Tullius' is a word by which all the things said above are equivocal among themselves with this very expression.[5] Since, therefore, this one word which I spoke, namely, 'Tullius,' can be so variously defined by me according to the terms of art, can we doubt that there is a type of ambiguity that is derived from equivocals and which may be rightly said to come from art? For we have said that equivocals are those which cannot be contained by one definition as they can by one name.

Look now at another kind of equivocals which we said comes from the use of the speaker.[6] Now I call 'use' that for the sake of which we learn words. For who seeks and collects words for their own sake? And so now let us suppose someone who hears what is spoken, but in such

[18] aliquem sic audire, ut ei notum sit nihil de partibus orationis / aut de metris quaeri aut de verborum aliqua disciplina. Tamen adhuc potest, cum dicitur 'Tullius', aequi|vocorum ambiguitate impediri. Hoc enim nomine et ipse qui fuit summus orator et eius picta imago vel| statua et codex quo eius litterae continentur et si quid est in sepulchro eius cadaveris significari potest.| Diversis enim notionibus[239] dicimus: 'Tullius ab interitu patriam liberavit' et 'Tullius inauratus in Capitolio stat' et / 'Tullius totus tibi legendus est' et 'Tullius hoc loco sepultus est'. Unum enim nomen, sed diversis haec omnia| definitionibus explicanda sunt. Hoc igitur genus aequivocorum est, in quo iam nulla de disciplina verborum| oritur ambiguitas sed de ipsis rebus quae significantur. At si utrumque confundat audientem vel legentem,| sive quod ex arte sive quod ex loquendi usu dicitur, nonne tertium genus recte adnumerabitur? quod ex loquendi usu dicitur, nonne tertium genus recte adnumerabitur? cuius| exemplum in sententia quidem apertius apparet, ut si quis dicat: 'multi dactylico metro scripserunt ut est / Tullius'. Nam hic incertum, utrum 'Tullius' pro exemplo dactyli pedis an dactylici[240] poetae positum sit, quorum| illud ex arte hoc ex usu loquendi accipitur. Sed in simplicibus etiam verbis contingit, tamquam si hoc ver|bum grammaticus audientibus discipulis enuntiet, ut[241] supra ostendimus.|

Cum igitur haec tria genera manifestis inter se rationibus differant, rursum primum genus in duo| dividitur. Quidquid enim ex arte verborum facit ambiguitatem, partim sibi pro exemplo esse potest, partim / non potest. Cum enim definiero, quid significet[242] 'nomen', possum hoc ipsum exempli gratia supponere. Etenim| hoc quod dico 'nomen' utique nomen est; hac enim lege per casus flectitur[243] cum dicimus "nomen, nominis,| nomini et cetera". Item cum definio[244] quid significet 'dactylus pes'[245], hoc ipsum potest esse pro exemplo. Etenim| cum dicimus 'dactylus', unam longam syllabam et duas deinde breves enuntiamus. At vero cum definitur| 'adverbium' quid significet, non potes[246] hoc ipsum in exemplum dicere[247]. Etenim cum 'adverbium' dicimus, / haec ipsa enuntiatio nomen[248] est. Ita secundum aliam notionem adverbium utique adverbium est et non[249] est| nomen, secundum aliam vero adverbium non est adverbium quia nomen est. Item 'pes creticus' quando quid| significet defi-

239 rationibus QG. 240 dactylici *conj. Erasmus, Lovan.*: dactyli et *codd.* 241 et DB. 242 significat G. 243 plectitur DB. 244 definiero *conj. Crecelius.* 245 pes *conj. Keil*: per DBPOQ *om.* G *secl. Crecelius.* 246 potest DBPOQ. 247 dici *conj. Crecelius.* 248 non O. 249 *conj. Ben.* nomen *codd.*

a way that he pays no attention to parts of speech or meter or anything
[18] else having to do with the study of words. It is still possible for him to be hindered by the ambiguity of equivocals when someone says 'Tullius,' for by this name can be signified the man who was the greatest orator and his picture or statue and a book which contains his writings and his corpse in the grave, if there is anything of it left. It is with different things in mind that we say, 'Tullius freed the fatherland from ruin' and 'Tullius stands gilded on the Capitol,' and 'You must read all of Tullius,' and 'Tullius is buried in this place.'[7] For there is one name, but all of these things must be explained by different definitions. This, therefore, is the kind of equivocals in which ambiguity arises not from the study of words but from the very things that are signified.

But if a combination of both confuses a hearer or a reader, whether it is called 'from art' or 'from the use of the speaker,' should not a third kind be recognized? This will become clearer if we illustrate with the statement, 'Many wrote in dactylic meter, for example, Tullius.' It is uncertain in this statement whether 'Tullius' is given as an example of a dactylic foot or as a dactylic poet. Of these, the former arises from art, the latter from ordinary use. This can also occur in simple words, as when a teacher of grammar utters this word to his listening students, as we pointed out above.

Since these three kinds differ among themselves for clear reasons, the first kind is again divided into two. For whatever causes ambiguity from the art of words can in some cases be examples of themselves and in other cases cannot. When I define what 'name' signifies, I am able to give this itself as an example, for 'name' is certainly a name, since it is declined regularly by case, as we say *nomen, nominis, nomini,* and so on.[8] Likewise when I define what 'dactylic foot' signifies, the word itself can be an example. For when we say 'dactylus,' we pronounce one long syllable and then two short ones. But when we define what 'adverb' signifies, we cannot use the word as an example of itself, since this expression itself is a name. Thus in one sense an adverb is certainly an adverb and not a name, but in another sense 'adverb' is not an adverb because it is a name. Likewise when we define what 'creticus' signifies, we cannot use it as an example

nitur, non potest hoc ipsum exemplo esse. Haec enim enuntiatio quando[250] dicimus 'creticus' prima| longa syllaba deinde duabus brevibus constat, quod autem significat longa syllaba et brevis et longa est. Ita| et hic secundum aliam notionem creticus nihil est aliud quam creticus et dactylus non est, secundum aliam / vero creticus non est creticus quia dactylus est.|

Secundum item[251] genus, quod iam praeter disciplinas verborum ad loquendi usum dictum est pertinere,| duas habet formas. Nam aequivoca inde[252] sunt aut ex eadem origine[253] aut ex diversa. Ex eadem origine appello|, quae quamvis uno nomine ac non sub una definitione teneantur, [19] uno tamen quasi fonte demanant; ut est / illud quod 'Tullius' et homo et statua et codex et cadaver intellegi potest. Non possunt quidem ista una| definitione concludi, sed tamen unum habent fontem, ipsum scilicet verum hominem, cuius et illa statua et| illi libri[254] et illud cadaver est. At[255] cum dicimus 'nepos', longe ex diversa origine filium filii et luxuriosum| significat[256]. Haec ergo distincta teneamus, et vide illud genus, quod ex eadem origine appello, in quae iterum[257] / dividatur. Nam dividitur in duo, quorum unum translatione alterum declinatione contingit[258]. Translationem| voco cum vel similitudine unum nomen fit multis rebus, ut 'Tullius' et ille in quo magna eloquentia fuit et| statua eius dicitur – vel ex toto cum pars cognominatur ut cum cadaver eius[259] Tullius dici potest – vel ex| parte totum ut cum 'tecta' dicimus totas domos – aut a genere species: 'verba' enim principaliter omnia dicuntur[260]| quibus loquimur, sed tamen verba proprie nominata sunt quae per modos et per tempora declinamus – aut / a specie genus: nam cum 'scholastici' non solum proprie sed et primitus dicantur hi, qui adhuc in scholis| sunt, in omnes tamen qui in litteris vivunt nomen hoc usurpatum est – aut ab efficiente effectum ut 'Cicero' est| liber Ciceronis – aut ab effecto efficiens ut 'terror' qui terrorem facit – aut a continente quod continetur,| ut 'domus' etiam qui in domo sunt dicuntur – aut conversa vice ut 'castanea' etiam[261] arbor dicitur[262] – vel| si quid aliud inveniri[263] potest, quod ex eadem origine quasi transferendo cognominetur. Vides ut arbitror, /

250 quod DBPO. 251 igitur G. 252 dicta G. 253 origine: +venientia G. 254 illi libri: ille liber G. 255 ut DBPQ ex diversa origine ut G. 256 significet G. 257 item QG. 258 contigit DB. 259 illius OG. 260 omnia dicuntur: dicuntur omnia O dicunt Romani G. 261 *om.* G. 262 dicitur: +quae non est OQG +et fructus B. 263 invenerit D invenire P.

of itself. For when we utter this expression 'creticus,' there is first a long syllable and then two short ones, but what it signifies is a long syllable, then a short and a long. Thus here, too, in one sense a creticus is none other than a creticus and is not a dactyl; in another sense 'creticus' is certainly not a creticus because it is a dactyl.

Now the second kind, which has been said to pertain to the use of the speaker apart from the disciplines dealing with words, also has two forms. For equivocals are either from a single source or from different sources. I say that equivocals have a single source when they are included by a single name and, though they are not included by a single definition, still [19] they flow as from a single spring, for example, in the case above where 'Tullius' can be understood as a man and a statue and a book and a corpse. Although these are not included under one definition, they have one source, namely, the man himself whose statue and books and corpse they are. On the other hand, '*nepos*' signifies both a son's son and a spendthrift from very different sources.[9]

Let us, therefore, keep these distinct and look further at the first kind, which I say comes from the same source. It is once again to be divided into two classes, of which one happens through transference, the other through declension. I call it transference (1) when by similarity one name is used of many things, as both the man, renowned for his great eloquence, and his statue can be called 'Tullius.' Or (2) when the part is named from the whole, as when his corpse can be said to be Tullius; or (3) the whole from the part, as when we call whole houses 'roofs.' Or (4) the species from the genus, for '*verba*' is used chiefly of all the words by which we speak, although the words which we decline by mood and tense are named '*verba*' in a special sense. Or (5) the genus from the species, as 'scholars' were originally and properly those who were still in school, though now all who pursue a literary career use this name. Or (6) the effect from the cause, as 'Cicero' is a book of Cicero's. Or (7) the cause from the effect, as something is a terror which causes terror. Or (8) what is contained from the container, as those who are in a house are called a household. Or (9) vice versa, as a tree is called 'chestnut.'[10] Or if any other manner is discovered in which something is named by a transfer, as it were, from the same source. You see, I believe, what makes for am-

quam faciat in verbis ambiguitatem. Quae autem ad eandem originem pertinentia condicione declinationis| ambigua esse diximus, talia sunt. Fac verbi causa quemquam dixisse 'pluit', ⟨***⟩[264] et haec diverse utique definienda| sunt. Item 'scribere' qui dicit, incertum est utrum infinitivo[265] activi an imperativo passivi pronuntiaverit. 'Homo'| quamvis unum nomen sit et una enuntiatio, tamen fit aliud ex nominativo aliud ex vocativo[265a] quomodo[266]| 'doctus' et 'docte' ubi enuntiatio quoque di-
20 versa est. ['Doctius' aliud est cum dicimus 'doctius mancipium', / aliud cum dicimus 'doctius illo iste disputavit'.][267] Declinatione igitur ambiguitas orta est. Nam declina|tionem nunc appello, quidquid sive per voces sive per significationes flectendo verba contingit. 'Hic doctus'| enim[268] et 'o docte' etiam[269] per voces flexum est, 'hic homo' autem et 'o homo' per solas significationes. Sed| hoc genus ambiguitatum minutatim concidere ac persequi paene infinitum est. Itaque locum ipsum hactenus| notasse suffecerit, ingenio praesertim tuo. Vide nunc ea quae[270]
25 diversa origine veniunt. Nam et[271] ipsa divi/duntur adhuc in duas primas formas, quarum una est, quae contingit diversitate linguarum: ut, cum dicimus| 'tu'[272], haec una vox aliud apud Graecos aliud apud nos
[20] significat. Quod genus notandum omnino[273] fuit; non / enim praescriptum est unicuique, quot[274] linguas nosset aut quot[275] linguis disputaret. Altera forma est, quae in[276]| una quidem lingua facit ambiguitatem, diversa tamen eorum origine, quae in uno vocabulo significantur[277], quale| est illud quod de nepote supra posuimus. Quod rursus in duo scinditur. Aut enim sub eodem genere partis| orationis fit – tam[278] nomen est enim nepos cum filium filii, quam cum luxuriosum significat – aut sub[279] di-
5 verso: / nam non solum aliud est cum dicimus 'qui'[279] ⟨*** aliud⟩[280]

264 *puto supplendum esse e.g.*: incertum est utrum praesenti tempori an praeterito pronuntiaverit. 265 infinito DP. 265a *Hic desinit* D; *pro reliqua parte tractatus adhibemus* d. 266 quomodo *conj. Hagen*: quam *codd.* quam ambiguitatem vitabit qui vocabulum aliquod addet ut *conj. Crecelius*. 267 *Haec verba secludenda aut alio loco inserenda puto quippe quae argumentationem interrumpunt*. 268 *om.* G. 269 tantum G. 270 quae: + ex G. 271 *om.* G. 272 istuc QG. 273 notandum omnino: non tantum omnino Q non tamen omnis novis *conj. Lovan. corruptelam, fortasse lacunam suspicor*. 274 quod d^{ac}BQG. 275 quod d^{ac}OQG. 276 *om.* G. 277 significatur dBPO. 278 *om.* G. 279 sub – qui: *om.* Q etiam sub alio genere fit partis orationis G. 280 *lacunam indicavit Crecelius*.

biguity in words. But those which we have said are ambiguous relative to a single source because of declension are such as the following. Take, for example, someone saying '*pluit.*' This can certainly be taken in different ways.[11] Again, if he were to say '*scribere*,' it is uncertain whether he has uttered the active infinitive or the passive imperative. '*Homo*' (man), although it is a single name and a single utterance, does one thing in the nominative case and another in the vocative, as do '*doctus*' and '*docte*' where the utterance is different. '*Doctius*' is one thing when we say '*doctius mancipium*' (the more learned slave), another when we say '*doctius illo iste disputavit*' (this man disputed more learnedly than that one).[12] Therefore ambiguity has its origin in declension, understanding by declension whatever happens as a consequence of changing words either in utterance or in signification. For '*hic doctus*' and '*o docte*' are changed in utterance as well; '*hic homo*' and '*o homo*' in signification alone. But to pursue and defeat, one by one, this kind of ambiguities is an endless task. And so it should be enough to take note of the topic and leave the rest to your ingenuity.

Now let us look at ambiguities which come from different sources. These are again divided into two primary forms. One depends on the diversity of languages. Thus when we say '*tu*,' this one utterance signifies
[20] one thing to the Greeks and another thing to us.[13] This kind ought merely to be noted; for it is not necessary for anyone [to study it, unless] he knows or disputes in several languages.[14] The other form is that which produces ambiguity in one language; nevertheless the things that are signified by a single word have different sources, just as we showed above in the case of '*nepos*.'[15] This is divided again into two. It occurs either under the same kind of part of speech, as '*nepos*' is just as much a name when it signifies a son's son as when it signifies a spendthrift. Or it occurs under different parts of speech, for '*qui*' can be not only a pronoun but,

ut dictum est[281] 'qui scis ergo istuc nisi periculum feceris',[H] sed etiam illud pronomen, hoc adverbium.

Iam ex utroque id est et ex arte et ex usu verborum, quod in aequivocis tertium genus posueramus, tot ambiguitatum formae possunt existere quot[282] in duobus superioribus enumeravimus[283].

Restat illud genus ambiguum, quod in scriptis solis reperitur, cuius tres sunt species. Aut enim spatio / syllabarum fit tale ambiguum aut acumine aut utroque: spatio[284], ut cum scribitur 'venit' de tempore incertum est propter occultum primae syllabae spatium; acumine autem, ut cum scribitur 'pone' utrum ab eo quod est 'pono' an ut dictum est[J] 'pone sequens namque hanc dederat Proserpina ⟨legem'⟩[285] incertum est propter latentem acuminis locum; at vero ex utroque fit, ut est quod superius de lepore diximus. Nam non solum producenda sed acuenda etiam est paenultima syllaba huius verbi, si ab eo quod est 'lepos', non ab eo quod / est 'lepus' deflexum est.

[H] Terentius, Andria III, 3, 33. [J] Vergil, Georgica IV, 487.

281 est: +a Terentio G. 282 quod dO. 283 enumerabimus dBO posueramus QG. 284 spatio: +autem G. 285 *suppl.* G *ex loco Vergilii*: *om.* dBPOQ.

as in the line "*Qui scias ergo istuc nisi periculum feceris?*" (How do you know unless you make a try?),[16] it can be an adverb.

Now in the third kind of equivocals, which arises from art and from the use of words together, as many forms of ambiguity can exist as we have set down in the two classes above.

There still remains that kind of ambiguity which is found only in writings. There are three species in this kind of ambiguity, for it is caused either by the length of syllables or by accent or by both. By length as when '*venit*' is written. The tense is uncertain because the length of the first syllable is not disclosed.[17] By accent as when '*pone*' is written and it is doubtful whether it is from the verb '*pono*,' as in the line "*Pone sequens, namque hanc dederat Proserpina legem*" (Following behind, for Proserpina had ordained this condition),[18] because the accent is not disclosed. And it is from both length and accent, as we have said above in the case of '*lepore*.'[19] For the penultimate is to be not only lengthened but accented if the word is a form of '*lepos*' but not if it is a form of '*lepus*.'

NOTES

CHAPTER I

[1] On the chapter divisions and titles see the Introduction, p. 25. When I do not follow the title given in *PL* 32 I will note my divergence.

[2] Augustine uses the Stoic name for logic, 'dialectic,' as had Cicero (*Top.* XII.53, *Or.* XXXII.113) and Varro (Pfligersdorffer, p. 137) before him. His definition of dialectic is also Stoic. It appears to be a mixture of the definitions given by Diogenes, VII.42: (1) rhetoric is the science of speaking well(ἐπιστήμην... εὖ λέγειν);(2) dialectic is the science of carrying on a discussion correctly (ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι). Augustine was not the first to give this definition. Barwick, p. 8, cites J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. III, frag. 267:διαλεκτικὴ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ εὖ διαλέγεσθαι.This fragment is from the Περὶ παθῶν falsely attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes (ed. by F. W. A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, III, Paris, 1881, pp. 570–578; the fragment is on p. 575). This little eclectic work is assigned to the second century A. D. See Pauly-Wissowa, I, col. 2167, and

Der Kleine Pauly, I, col. 349 (in the latter it is incorrectly titled Περὶ ἀρχῶν). I do not know of Augustine's definition occurring in earlier Latin authors, but similar definitions are found in Cicero, who calls dialectic *"ars bene disserendi"* (*De or.* II.xxxviii.157), and in Quintilian, who calls rhetoric *"bene dicendi scientia"* (*Inst. or.* II.xv.34). When I wrote "The Theory of Signs," p. 37, I did not know of the Περὶ παθῶν definition.

[3] Augustine here begins a classification which extends through Ch. III and which gives the basis for the division of dialectic into four parts (Ch. IV). The classification, with the corresponding parts, is as follows:

1. Simple words *(de loquendo)*
2. Compound words
   a. Do not make a statement
   b. Make a statement
      i. Neither true nor false *(de eloquendo)*
      ii. True or false
         α. Simple *(de proloquendo)*
         β. Compound *(de proloquiorum summa)*

Pinborg, p. 158, Duchrow, p. 43, and Barwick, pp. 8ff., have noted the similarity of Augustine's classification to the Stoic classification of λεκτά given by Diogenes (VII.63–75) and Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus mathematicos* VIII.69–74 and 93). Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic*, p. 16, gives a summary diagram of this Stoic classification. But Augustine is discussing words, the Stoic φώναι. In this respect he is closer to Aristotle's *De interpretatione* 1–5 (summarized by I. M. Bocheński, *Ancient Formal Logic*, p. 28). In any case the *simplex-coniuncta* distinction is common in the logical writings of antiquity. We know that Augustine would have encountered it when he read Aristotle's *Categories*. In Ch. 2 Aristotle says, "Of things that are said, some involve combination (συμπλοκήν) while others are said without combination. Examples of those involving combination are 'man runs', 'man wins'; and of those without combination 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'." (Trans. by J. L. Ackrill, Clarendon Aristotle Series, p. 3.) In his translation of the *Categories* Boethius translated συμπλοκή as *'complexio'* (*Ar. Lat.* I, p. 5, ed. L. Minio-Paluello), but the earlier Pseudo-Augustinian *Categoriae decem* may be closer to the language Augustine would have found in the Latin translation which he read. In it we find, *"Scire etiam debemus verba aut simplicia esse aut certe coniuncta: coniuncta sunt 'equus currit'; simplicia, cum haec separantur et dicuntur singula, ut 'equus', 'currit'."* (*Ar. Lat.* I, p. 139; *PL* 32, 1422). The most important parallel to the first two chapters is Capella's *De dialectica* 388–392 (Book IV of his *De Nuptiis*), which Crecelius, p. 5, and others have cited. Capella makes the basic distinction between simple and compound words using *'separata'* instead of *'simplicia'* for the former; but he discusses first, second, and third person verbs in the same way as Augustine does in Ch. I and makes points about *sententia* similar to those Augustine makes in Ch. II (see note 1 on Ch. II). This parallelism has led scholars to infer that Augustine and Capella have a common source. Fischer, esp. pp. 52f. and 62f., has argued rather convincingly that this common source is Varro's *De dialectica*, the second book of his lost *Disciplinarum libri*. Fischer argues against the view of R. Reitzenstein (*Varro und Johannes Mauropus*, pp. 69–80) that *De lingua Latina* I, also not extant, is the main source. Several of the editors of Varro have viewed Augustine's *De dialectica* I–IV as a fragment of Varro. August Wilmanns gives these chapters (omitting a few sentences) as a fragment of *De ling. Lat.* XIV–XVI (fr. 32, pp. 161–166). Later editors of Varro are uncertain which of Varro's works *De dial.* draws upon (Funaioli, fr. 265, pp. 278–280, and Goetz and Schoell, fr. 130, pp. 234–236).

[4] Augustine is apparently referring to the fact that *'disputare'* is composed of the inseparable prefix *'dis'* and the verb *'putare'*. He thus makes it clear that the basis for the distinction between simple and compound words is the signification of words and not their phonetic makeup.

[5] I have here translated *'cum dicimus 'loquor'"* as 'the word *'loquor'*.' The phrase *'cum dicimus'* occurs so frequently throughout the work that it would be tiresome to continually translate it as 'when we say.' Moreover, it may be that Augustine is using the phrase in a way similar to the way later medieval writers used *'hoc quod dico'*, namely, to indicate mention rather than use of a word. On the other hand, I have occasionally retained 'when we say' as a reminder that Augustine is almost always thinking of spoken words. See Ch. V, 7, 11–18, where spoken words are said to be words in the proper sense of the term.

[6] First and second person verbs in Latin signify the person speaking or the person spoken to, whereas third person verbs are by themselves indeterminate as to a subject, except in the case of impersonal verbs. Martianus Capella, IV.389, also uses the verb *'pluit'* to make the same point as Augustine makes here.

CHAPTER II

[1] *'Sententia'* has several meanings and in this context could be translated in several ways. I have chosen 'statement' because it has the connotation in English of something spoken which is more complete than an utterance (the latter term I will often use to translate *'vox'*). I have decided against translating *'sententia'* by 'sentence' because the latter refers properly to a set of written words and, as a technical term, is more appropriate to grammar than to logic. The phrase *'quae sententiam comprehendunt'* could be translated as 'which express a meaning' or 'thought' or 'judgment', but the second seems too psychological and all three would require circumlocutions if they were consistently used for *'sententia.'* One disadvantage of 'statement' is that it has the connotation of a declarative or truth-claiming utterance. It should be clear from the context, however, that Augustine means for *'sententia'* to apply to any set of combined words which express any sort of complete meaning. The same usage is found in Capella, IV.390–392. Varro used *'sententia'* in his definition of the Stoic ἀξίωμα as a *"sententia in qua nihil desideratur"* (Wilmanns fr. 36, Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* XVI.viii.6).

[2] For a longer list of kinds of non-truth-claiming statements see Apuleius (?), *Peri hermeneias* I, p. 176 (ed. of P. Thomas, 1921). Interest in such statements as a part of logic goes back to Stoic sources. See Diogenes Laertius, VII.67–68, and Sextus Empiricus, VIII.71–72. Aristotle, on the other hand, relegates them to rhetoric and poetics (*De int.* 4).

[3] By this last sentence Augustine does not intend to place such statements outside of the domain of the dialectician, which is clear from Ch. IV; rather he is saying that they do not come under discussion with respect to truth-values. Capella, IV.391, also uses *'quaestio'* to speak of the appropriateness of discussing the truth or falsity of a statement.

CHAPTER III

[1] I translate *'de'* by 'in respect of' to make it clear that the connection itself is not judged but rather the statements in relation to the connection which relates them.

[2] Barwick, p. 9, notes that Cicero in *De oratore* II.xxxviii.158 uses *'summa'* as the name for the conclusion of an argument. It would not seem to have been the name commonly used by Latin authors; *'conclusio'* and *'complexio'* are the more usual names for a conclusion (Cicero, *De inv.* I.xlvii.87; Quintilian, V.xiv.1–2 and 5; Apuleius, VII, p. 183; Capella, IV.407). Quintilian (V.xiv.11) and Gellius (II.viii.8–9) do use *'summa'* and *'finis'* when they discuss the position of a conclusion in an argument. *'Summa'* may be an attempt to translate

the Stoic technical term for a conclusion, συμπέρασμα (see Mates, p. 135, for this term). Literally it means that which is finished by joining together and it could be literally translated into Latin by *'consumma'* or *'consummatio'*. See p. 40, n. 118, above for Erasmus's scholium on *'summa'*. – In the same *De oratore* passage where he uses *'summa'* Cicero, describing the Stoics' science of dialectic, also distinguishes between statements expressed simply *(simpliciter)* and those expressed in conjunction with other statements *(coniuncte)*, a distinction Augustine has just made at the beginning of this chapter.

[3] Augustine's examples of deductive arguments are Stoic in form, the first and second undemonstrated arguments of the Stoic system – known since the Middle Ages as *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*. The presence of the second is obscured in the Augustine editions by the omission of the ten words *"aut restet illi docere quod non moveatur, ut consequatur summa"* (p. 6, 15f.). Crecelius restored them on the basis of his three MSS. I find that his reading is supported by Paris 7730 (P), Orleans 263 (O), Paris 12949 (G), and Einsiedeln 324, as well as by the Venice edition. The words are omitted by Troyes 40 and Philadelphia 63. For full accounts of Stoic deduction theory see Mates, pp. 67ff., and Kneale and Kneale, pp. 158ff. As noted in the Introduction, p. 5, the theory of deduction in Augustine's other works is also Stoic.

CHAPTER IV

[1] I have supplied the title. The one printed by the Maurists – *Conjunctas sententias subdividit* – is innaccurate.

[2] Capella, IV.338–343, uses these same rubrics for the parts of dialectic and organizes his book by them. Barwick, p. 10, points to Diogenes VII.63 for the Stoic background of the fourfold division given in this chapter. Fischer, pp. 28f., believes that the source for the rubrics used by Augustine and Capella is Varro; Pfligersdorffer, pp. 140–147, argues for a later origin. Whatever their common source(s), Augustine and Capella differ from each other in a number of ways. In the first place, Capella lists fifth and sixth parts – *de iudicando* and *quae dicenda rhetoribus commodata est* – which belong more appropriately to grammar and rhetoric. In the second place, the specific contents of the parts differ. Capella is much more Aristotelian than Augustine. A detailed comparison can be made for the first part only, since that is as far as Augustine gets. In Chs. V and VI he says that under *'de loquendo'* he will discuss *verba, dicibilia, dictiones*, and *res*, and concerning *verba* he will discuss the origin, force, declension, and arrangement of words. Under *'de loquendo'* Capella, on the other hand, dicusses the predicables *(genus, forma, differentia, accidens, proprium)*, definition and partition, equivocation, the ten categories of Aristotle, and the theory of opposition (IV.344–387). The only shared topic is equivocation, which Augustine takes up in the last chapters. Judging from the examples he gives in Ch. III, we would expect Augustine to have given the Stoic theory of deduction had he gotten to the fourth part. Capella gives both the Stoic and the Aristotelian theories (IV.404–422).

In my translation of the rubrics for the parts of dialectic I have tried to convey the progression from simple to compound words, and for the latter, from general to more specific kinds of compound words. 'On naming' connotes singularity. 'On expressing' implies that single words have been put together to say something. 'On asserting' refers to a certain kind of expression, namely, an affirming or a denying of something. 'On concluding from assertions' indicates a specific kind of interest with respect to assertions. Augustine does not use the nominal *'eloquium'* and uses *'proloquium'* only this one time. On these terms see Capella, IV.389–391. The latter term was apparently one of the translations of the Stoic ἀξίωμα. See Gellius, XVI.viii.1–8. In my translation of the rubrics I have been helped by the translations given by C. S. Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York, 1928), p. 94, for Capella

(on naming, defining, affirming, and concluding), and by Duchrow, p. 43 (vom Sprechen, vom Ausrufen, von der vollständige Aussage, vom Schluss).

CHAPTER V

[1] I have supplied this title in place of the more elaborate one given by the editions – *Quomodo de rebus, verbis, dicibilibus, dictionibus tractetur in logica.* A large portion of this chap. is regarded as a fragment of Varro by Wilmanns (fr. 1, pp. 142–144), Funaioli (fr. 265, pp. 280f.), and Goetz and Schoell (fr. 130, pp. 236f.). They omit from the fragment the explanation of the relation of spoken and written signs (7, 12–16) and the illustration at the end of the chapter (8, 12ff.).

[2] At this point the Augustine editions include the following sentences: Sciuntur enim corporalia, intelliguntur spiritalia, latet vero ipse deus et informis materia. Deus est quod neque corpus est neque animal est neque sensus est neque intellectus est neque aliquid quod excogitari potest. Informis materia est mutabilitas mutabilium rerum, capax omnium formarum. ("For corporeal things are sensed and spiritual things are understood; but God himself and formless matter are truly hidden. God is neither body, nor animal, nor sense, nor understanding, nor anything which can be thought. Formless matter is the changeableness of changeable things, the capacity for all forms.") This apparent interpolation is absent from all of the MSS which I have examined and is not in the Venice edition. Its source is probably a gloss which was copied as part of the text in some MS. Glosses in Paris B. N. lat. 7730 and 12949 are close in content to the *'corporalia,' 'spiritalia,'* and *'deus et informis materia'* of the interpolated passage. The former (fol. 16v) glosses Augustine's *"sentitur vel intellegitur vel latet"* with *"ut terrena," "celestia,"* and *"divina."* The latter (fol. 13r) glosses the three verbs more elaborately: *"Sicut sol et cetera quae in mundo sunt"; "Sicut natura angelorum"*; and *"Sicut deus et eius invisibilitas vel maiestas et natura investigabilis."*

[3] Compare the definitions of 'thing' and 'sign' with Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* I.ii.2 and II.i.1, particularly with the definition of a sign in the latter passage as "... a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the senses." (Trans. by D. W. Robertson, 1958, p. 34).

[4] Augustine's definitions of *'loqui'* and *'articulata'* should be compared with the Stoic definitions given by Diogenes (VII.55–57). Augustine's *'vox'* corresponds to the Stoics' φωνή and his *'loqui'* corresponds to the Stoics' λέγειν or, as a substantive, λόγος. Augustine seems to have no equivalent to the Stoics' λέξις, an articulate but non-significant sound. See Kneale and Kneale, p. 139, for a brief discussion of these notions. I have translated *'litteris'* as 'letters,' even though Augustine makes it clear a few lines later that a *littera* is a spoken and not a written entity. Both the English and the Latin term ordinarily refer to a written entity. Augustine's use apparently goes back to Stoic sources, for according to Diogenes (VII.56) the Stoics said that 'letter' (τὸ γράμμα) signifies the sound, as well as the written symbol and the name of the sound or symbol. Definitions similar to Augustine's are found in a passage in the fourth-century Latin grammarian Diomedes which is regarded as a fragment of Varro's *De grammatica* by Goetz and Schoell (fr. 111, p. 228; the Diomedes is in Keil, *Grammatici Latini* I, p. 420). Diomedes says that an *articulata vox* is one uttered by a rational, verbal man and that it is also called *'litteralis vel scriptilis'* because *'litteris comprehendi potest.'* Augustine's *'comprehendi litteris potest'* clearly echoes this Varronian passage.

[5] Augustine did not get to this and he does not say where it would be discussed. Capella includes a paragraph on defining under *de loquendo* (IV.349). It is clear from *De ordine*

II.xiii.38 and *De doctrina christiana* II.xxxv.53 that Augustine regards definition as an appropriate topic for dialectic.

[6] See Aristotle, *De interp.* 1, 16a 5, for the view that written marks are symbols of spoken sounds.

[7] Augustine here begins the account of four elements in signification upon which the chief fame of the work in the history of logic rests. See Kneale and Kneale, p. 188, and Kretzmann, "History of Semantics," p. 366. I have not translated the four terms Augustine uses for two reasons. First, they are technical terms and by leaving them untranslated I call attention to this and force the reader to attend to the definitions given. This consideration is particularly compelling in the case of *'verbum,'* which in the opening statement of the chapter is defined as a *rei signum* but here is said to be an utterance given not in order to signify something. Second, it is difficult to translate *'dicibile'* and *'dictio'* without interpreting them more than I wish to in the text itself. There is a precedent for leaving *'dicibile'* untranslated. In his exposition of Stoic logic, Thomas Stanley used the Anglicized 'dicible' for the Stoic *lekton* (*The History of Philosophy*, The Eighth Part, London, 1656, p. 40). His source for this term is almost certainly *De dialectica*, for he knows our work (see note 8 on Ch. VI and note 1 on Ch. IX) and translates V, 8, 9f. (without credit) in his chapter on dicibles: "Dicible therefore is a word, and yet signifies not a word, but that which is understood in the word, and is contained in the minde." (p. 40) His immediate source may, however, be the *Dialectica Ciceronis* by Adam Bursius (Samoscius, 1604), a work Stanley refers to in a marginal note on the paragraph from which the sentence just quoted is taken. I have not seen the work by Bursius. If I were to translate *'dicibile'* and *'dictio'*, I would use something like 'the sayable' or 'the expressible' for the former and 'saying' or 'significant utterance' for the latter.

[8] Augustine doubtless has in mind the first word of Vergil's *Aeneis* and portrays here what seems to have been the standard classroom practice of considering even literary texts one word at a time. See, for example, Servius' commentary on the *Aeneis* (ed. by G. Thilo and H. Hagen, Leipzig, 1881, vol. 2, pp. 5f.) and Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (New York: Mentor, 1956), p. 376.

[9] Thus Augustine's account of signification gives him the topics to be considered under *'de loquendo.'* In Ch. VI he begins detailed discussion of *verba*, but he never got to further discussion of the *dicibile*, *dictio*, and *res*. Similar notions appear in his later works, especially in *De doctrina christiana* and *De trinitate* (see my article, "The Theory of Signs"), not, however, dressed in the same technical terminology as is found in Ch. V. This chapter has been dealt with by almost everyone who has written on *De dialectica*. Certain things about it are fairly clear, in part thanks to Augustine's own illustration. The *verbum* is described in contrast to the *dictio*; the former is uttered for its own sake, the latter in order to signify something else. This distinction seems to be the same as our distinction between the mention and ordinary use of a word. The grammarian in Augustine's example does not use *'arma'* to signify anything; he merely mentions it for the purpose of analyzing its grammatical properties. Had he been using the word, his attention would have been directed not to the word itself but rather to other things, to *res* in the proper sense of the term. These three elements – *verbum, dictio, res* – are relatively easy to understand. The difficulty comes when we turn to the *dicibile*. Among interpreters of the chapter there is agreement that Augustine's notion is very close to the Stoics' notion of the *lekton*. Due, however, to the obscurity of the latter as it is known to us, this does not help a great deal in understanding the *dicibile*. I do not know of the term being used in a technical sense before Augustine and as far as I know he did not use it again in this sense. Moreover, it is rarely used by later writers on logic. Norman Kretzmann, "Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the *Propositio*," *The Journal of Philosophy* **67** (1970), p. 773, n. 7, cites one instance of its use by William of Moerbeke to translate *'lekton'* and I have found that it is used by William of Sherwood to define a

predicable as what can be said (*Introductiones in logicam* II.1). The word itself is formed by adding the suffix *'-ibile'* to the root of *'dico,'* to say or speak. Thus literally it is the sayable. Augustine believes that prior to and independent of speaking there is something in the mind which may be expressed by speech and which in turn is understood when one hears intelligible speech. This would not seem to be merely a thought or an idea in the psychological sense of those terms, but Augustine does not tell us how it is related to thought. Here we are in a subject which cannot be dealt with adequately in a note. I refer the reader to my article (mentioned above) and to the excellent discussions of Stoic theories of meaning in Mates, pp. 11–33, and Kneale, pp. 138–149. It would, of course, be interesting to know how Augustine would have discussed the *dictio*, *dicibile*, and *res* had he gotten that far in *De dial.* How the notion of the *res* would have been discussed in a book on logic is a puzzle. Barwick, p. 13, believes that Augustine would have dealt with the Stoic doctrine of categories.

CHAPTER VI

[1] Crecelius's change in the punctuation of 8, 26–30 (the earlier editions made this into two sentences) requires a change in the placement of the chapter beginning. It is moved to the beginning of Crecelius's paragraph.

[2] These four topics and the four introduced in Ch. V give the following outline of topics to be covered under *de loquendo*:

1. *De verbis*
   a. Origin (Ch. VI)
      i. Has no explanation
      ii. Has an explanation
         α. Similarity of things and sounds
         β. Similarity of things to each other
         γ. Proximity
         δ. Contrariety
   b. Force (Chs. VII–X; see below for outline)
   c. Declension
   d. Arrangement
2. *De dicibilibus*
3. *De dictionibus*
4. *De rebus*

Augustine gets through only the topic of the force of words. He does not say here what he means by *'declinatio'* and *'ordinatio.'* In X, 19, 20f. he uses the former to refer to changes in both the inflection and the function of words. Barwick, pp. 23 and 26f., notes that three of Augustine's topics – *origo, declinatio*, and *ordinatio* – are the topics by which Varro organizes the twenty-four books of his *De lingua Latina* (VII.110 and VIII.1). By *'declinatio'* Varro means not only grammatical inflection but also other forms of alteration of words. See esp. *De ling. Lat.* VIII.5–24 and X.3ff., and Barwick, pp. 34–57 (on the Stoic theory of declension, κλίσις). By *'ordinatio'* (Varro uses *'coniunctio'* in the passages cited by Barwick) Varro means syntax, according to Barwick, p. 21. The part of *De ling. Lat.* covering this is lost.

[3] Crecelius cites Cicero's *De natura deorum* III.xxiv.61–63, a passage in which the Stoic practice of explaining the names of the gods by etymologies is criticized and ridiculed. Duchrow, pp. 56–59, notes that Augustine's attitude toward etymology is also Varronian. See, for example, *De lingua Latina* VIII.xii.27. The greater part of Ch. VI has been regarded as a fragment of Varro (Wilmanns, fr. 1 and 2, pp. 144–150; Funaioli, fr. 265, pp. 281–284;

Goetz and Schoell, fr. 130, pp. 237–241). Though Augustine apparently owes nothing to it directly, no study of etymology in antiquity can be made without reference to Plato's *Cratylus*.

[4] Since in most cases translating the words which Augustine gives as examples would obscure the etymology, I have left all of the examples untranslated for the sake of consistency. I have put a translation in parentheses following the first use of each word. Many of the examples given by Augustine can be found in other writers. I will refer to some of these which have been located by Crecelius and others. On the derivations for *'verbum'* the most interesting parallels are in a statement attributed to Varro that *verba a veritate dicta esse* (Goetz and Schoell, p. 238) and in Augustine's own *De magistro* V.12 where *verba* are said to be named *a verberando*.

[5] J. Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquae* (Leipzig, 1903), p. 238, lists this among the fragments of Ennius (no. L). Vahlen is uncertain about which work it is from. In an earlier edition (1854) he attributed this fragment to Fortunatianus; in this edition he gives the source as Augustine. According to Hagendahl, pp. 170–172 and 377, Augustine's knowledge of Ennius was indirect. Hagendahl does not include this or other quotations from *De dial.* in his list of Testimonia, since he does not regard *De dial.* as authentic.

[6] *Georgica* III.223. For Augustine's quotations from the *Georgica*, see Hagendahl, pp. 369–375; on his knowledge of Vergil, see pp. 384–463.

[7] Augustine is here an important source for information about the Stoic theory of the origin of words. Since, however, he disagrees with the Stoics, his account of their theory cannot be regarded as unbiased. See W. S. Allen, "Linguistic Problems and Their Treatment in Antiquity," unpublished Cambridge University dissertation, pp. 440–442.

[8] This is a puzzling sentence to this point. The tradition is clearly confused here. – Stanley translates Ch. VI from here to the next to the last sentence of the chapter as part of his account of Stoic teachings on Voice, Speech, and Words (pp. 30–32). He gives credit by the marginal note *"S. August. de Dialect. cap. 6."*

[9] See the fragment of Varro's *De Grammatica* (Goetz and Schoell, fr. 113, p. 229) where, in a discussion of the various qualities of *syllabae*, *'crux'* is given as an example of a rough *(aspera)* sound and *'lana'* as an example of a light *(levis)* sound.

[10] The similarity of these two words is more obvious if the latter is taken in the singular – *crus* – instead of in the plural.

[11] On this derivation of *'piscina'* see Donatus, *Ars grammatica* III.6.2, and *De doctrina christiana* III.xxix.40, where the same account is given.

[12] This etymology is also given in *De doctr. chr.* III.xxix.41 and by Quintilian, I.vi.34, and Capella, IV.360.

[13] This explanation of the origin of *'foedus'* is obscure. Crecelius refers to Isidore, *Etym.*, X.100 (actually 101), but Isidore derives it from *'haedo'* (goat) by the change of a letter. A note in Barreau's French translation of *De dialectica* (p. 58) says that the head of a pig placed on a pike was sometimes a military insignia. Thus the etymology would apparently be based on the army's function in forming alliances. A similar explanation could be made on the basis of the use of *'caput porci'* to describe a certain battle formation (see Ammianus Marcellinus, *Rerum Gestarum* XVII.13.9). Stanley, p. 31, mistranslates the sentence as: "But, if we derive *porcus*, as some do, *a foeditate*, ..."

[14] *Aeneis* V.755. Hagendahl, pp. 321–364, assembles Augustine's many quotations from Vergil's epic. Varro, V.143, gives the same explanation of *'urbs.'*

[15] This sentence is awkward as it stands in the best MSS. Crecelius reads 'origo *ad*que ratio reddi *non* possit' for which the translation would be: "For there are innumerable words whose origin and cause cannot be discovered. Either there is none, as I believe, or it is hidden, as the Stoics maintain." Only Paris 12949 (G) includes the *'non'* which the context seems to require.

[16] The phrase "'v' functions as a consonant" sounds odd to English speakers, since 'v' is always a consonant in modern English. In classical Latin, however, the same written form (usually 'u') was used to represent both the English 'u' sound and the English 'w' sound. Since the Renaissance, 'v' has often been used to represent the latter.

[17] Augustine does not seem to have given a complete explanation of the origin of *'vites.'* He apparently means that the seizing and pressing of vines involves force *(vis)* in the same way as chains and withes do. See Isidore, *Etym.* XVII.v.2.

[18] Terence does this in *Eunuchus* IV.iv.21, line 688: *"hic est vietus vetus veternosus senex."* According to Hagendahl, p. 378, Augustine quotes Terence more than he quotes any other poet except Vergil. See pp. 259–262 for quotations from the *Eunuchus*.

CHAPTER VII

[1] In this chapter Augustine develops a notion broader than signification, describing a variety of ways in which words affect hearers. See Kretzmann, "History of Semantics," p. 366. Augustine's classification gives the following outline of topics for the chapter:

1. Words affect a hearer on their own account.
   a. By sense
      i. By nature
      ii. By custom
   b. By art
   c. By sense and art together
2. Words affect a hearer on account of what they signify.
3. Words affect a hearer both on their own account and on account of what they signify.

[2] The nature-custom distinction was commonly used in antiquity in discussions of word origins. The distinction is implicit in this sense in Ch. VI. See my article, "Signs," pp. 14f. In this chapter, however, Augustine is using the notions to distinguish between the sensible qualities of words which seem to him intrinsic and those which are relative to a hearer's experience.

[3] 'Artaxerxes' was the name of several Persian kings. For 'Euryalus' Augustine may be thinking of the boy described in *Aeneis* 5.294f. as "famed for beauty and flower of youth."

[4] On the authority of the Cologne MS Crecelius restored this sentence. In the earlier editions it had hardly made sense. As restored the sentence is obviously parallel to the sentence in 12, 15f. about 'Artaxerxes' and 'Euryalus'. The interpretation of the passage is not difficult. Whereas 'Motta' is an uncommon name, 'Cotta' is a common Roman cognomen, borne, for example, by Gaius Aurelius Cotta, consul in 75 B.C., who appears in Cicero's *De natura deorum*. Even though the names sound almost alike (and if anything, 'Cotta' is a bit harsher than 'Motta'), one is unfamiliar and therefore somehow "offends" the ears.

[5] I take *'vel... vel...'* in 13, 6f. as equivalent to *'et... et...'*. If Augustine's statement were taken as disjunctive, then it would describe two cases, in one of which there could be no possibility of being affected by what the name signifies (the one who does not know the Augustine who is writing this). The MSS I have examined all read *'Augustino'* and *'Augustinus'* for this passage.

[6] Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 14.2. Augustine quotes Sallust with great frequency. See Hagen-

dahl, pp. 226–239, for quotations from the work on Catiline, and pp. 630–649.

[7] In Ch. V Augustine distinguished dialectic from grammar by saying that the latter is concerned with sounds, with hearing of words alone. Now he distinguishes dialectic from rhetoric by saying that the latter is concerned with the pleasures of hearing, a more specific interest in sound than the grammarian has. Dialectic, on the other hand, is concerned with truth. Yet Augustine believes that both the dialectician and the orator should make use of the other's art. To find this idea expressed about the orator we need look to no less obvious a predecessor than Cicero, who says the orator should have the *acumen dialecticorum* (*De or.* I.xxviii.128) and who spells out in detail the dialectic which orators should master (*Orator* xxxii.113–xxxiii.117). Cicero may also be a source for Augustine's view of the style of most dialecticians (*De or.* II.xxxviii.159). For Stoic views on rhetoric and dialectic see the references given by Barwick, pp. 15f.

CHAPTER VIII

[1] The title printed by the Maurists is *'Obscurum et ambiguum,'* literally, 'The obscure and the ambiguous.' The outline for the remaining three chapters, which cover the ways hearers are kept from learning the truth in words, is:

1. Obscurity (Ch. VIII)
   a. Manifest to the senses, closed to the mind
   b. Closed to the senses, open to the mind
   c. Closed to both mind and senses
2. Ambiguity (Chs. IX–X)
   a. Doubt about what is said
      i. in univocals
      ii. in equivocals (see Ch. X)
   b. Doubt about what is written
      i. Length of syllables
      ii. Accent
      iii. Both length and accent

Notice that even though the topic is hindrances to the hearer Augustine also discusses ambiguity in *written* words, albeit briefly. For Augustine's views on obscurity and ambiguity in the written words of Scripture see the second and third books of *De doctrina christiana*. The chapter division for Ch. VIII has been moved to the beginning of Crecelius's paragraph, one sentence earlier than in the Maurist edition.

[2] In the Introduction (p. 31, note 13) I have noted Fischer's interpretation of Augustine's *Epistle* 26 and the accompanying poem of Licentius. On Fischer's view the books on the liberal arts were in the main a presentation of Varro's doctrines with elaborations and illustrations by Augustine for the benefit of his students. Ch. VIII fits this view well. In it Augustine explains the technical notions of obscurity and ambiguity by the use of two extended metaphors (the one just given and one soon to follow). He also uses again (as he had in Ch. V) the example of a teacher uttering a single word to a class. These metaphors and examples are probably the sort of thing that Licentius had come to expect from Augustine at Cassiciacum and hoped to find more of in the completed books on the liberal arts.

[3] *'Temetum'* refers to any intoxicating drink. The term is ante-classical and poetic and hence likely to be unknown to some students.

[4] Since the example is about a word, it would have been more accurate for Augustine to say that the students were ignorant of *quid significaret temetum* rather than *quid esset temetum*.

At 14, 27f. the use of *'significationis verbi'* makes it clear that it is the signification of the word that the students do not know. I have left *'temetum'* untranslated in order to convey Augustine's meaning.

[5] In these sentences I have departed from normal English word order in order to place 'great' at the beginning of the sentences, as it must be if they are to illustrate the point.

CHAPTER IX

[1] I have shortened the title from the one given by the Maurists – *Ambiguitatum genera duo*. Stanley, pp. 32f., translated the first part of this chapter (to 16, 6) as part of his chapter on the Stoic doctrine of Voice, Speech, and Words. He gives his source in a marginal note as *"D. August. de dialect."*, without indication of chapter.

[2] Crecelius, p. 15, and others cite Aulus Gellius, XI.xii.1 as evidence that this is the view of Chrysippus, the greatest of the Stoic logicians. Diogenes Laertius, VII.193, lists several works of Chrysippus on ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία). According to Diogenes (VII.62) ambiguity was discussed by the Stoics under the part of dialectic which they called περὶ φωνῆς. This part corresponds to Augustine's *de loquendo*. Ambiguity was also a common topic in works on rhetoric. See, for example, Quintilian, VII.ix.1–9.

[3] The following editors list this quotation as a fragment of Cicero's lost *Hortensius*: C. F. W. Mueller, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta quae Manserunt Omnia*, pt. IV, vol. III (Leipzig, 1890), fr. 99, p. 326; Michel Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron, Histoire et Reconstitution* (Paris, 1958), fr. 28, pp. 92f.; and Albertus Grilli, ed., M. Tulli Ciceronis, *Hortensius* (Milan, 1962), fr. 24, p. 25. Crecelius, p. 15, conjectures that the fragment is to be placed in the first part of the dialogue. Ruch and Grilli, who try to reconstruct the work, agree with Crecelius. From the time he read it in Carthage as a young man (*Conf.* III.iv.7), Augustine was greatly influenced by the *Hortensius*. He quotes it often, including many times in the Cassiciacum dialogues, which were written just before he undertook to write the books on the liberal arts. On Augustine and the *Hortensius*, see Hagendahl, pp. 81–94 and 486–497, and Maurice Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*, vol. I (Paris, 1958), pp. 19ff.

[4] Cicero, *De oratore* I.x.44. Crecelius, p. 15, notes that Augustine has changed Cicero's *'prudentibus'* to *'sapientibus'* and infers from this that he is quoting from memory. Further evidence of this is that Augustine says that Scaevola is speaking to Antony but in fact he is talking specifically to Crassus. Augustine quotes Scaevola in order to accuse Hortensius of using eloquence to mislead the ignorant, whereas Scaevola says that one should speak truly to the ignorant. Augustine knew Cicero's works well and quoted him often throughout his literary career. See Hagendahl, pp. 159–161, for other quotations of *De oratore* in Augustine, and pp. 477–588, for Cicero's influence on Augustine. Testard's two volume work, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*, is a major study of this topic.

[5] *'Acies'* was commonly used of both a military formation and the point of a sword, as well as of sharpness or acuteness of vision.

[6] I have translated *'sententia'* as 'sentence' because Augustine is clearly referring to written words here. By this example Augustine seems to have in mind coming upon a single written word. It is possible, however, that he is thinking of coming upon a sentence in which *'leporem'* occurs and is still ambiguous (for example, *'Leporem eius admiror'*). If so, the translation of *'qua sententia positum sit'* would more properly be 'with what thought it is put forth.' See Ch. II, note 1, above on *'sententia.'*

[7] The ultimate source of these definitions of 'univocal' and 'equivocal' is the first chapter of Aristotle's *Categories* (read by Augustine according to *Conf.* IV), where Aristotle speaks of things which are συνώνυμα (synonymous) and ὁμώνυμα (homonymous). The standard Latin translation for *'synonyma'* and *'homonyma'* was apparently *'univoca'* and *'aequivoca,'*

if we may judge from Boethius' translation of the *Categories* (*Ar. Lat.* I, p. 5). Capella also used the same terms (IV.355f.). (Augustine, Capella, and Boethius use different terms for Aristotle's ὄνομα and λόγος. For the former Augustine uses *'vocabulum'* and Capella and Boethius use *'nomen'*; for the latter Augustine and Capella use *'definitio'* and Boethius uses *'ratio.'*) I have used the standard English translation of these terms – 'univocal' and 'equivocal' – though they may be misunderstood. For in normal English usage these terms are applied to words. We ordinarily say that a *word* is used equivocally in two places, and so on. We do not say that *things* are equivocals or univocals, though we might sometimes say that two things are equivocally named. But it is of things that Aristotle is talking, not of words. On this see Kneale, pp. 25–29, and Ackrill's note on his trans. of the *Categories*, pp. 70f. The problem, at least in the definitions we are considering, is that Aristotle uses no technical term for 'thing.' He uses instead only a relative pronoun (ὅν, *quorum* in Boethius). Augustine's manner of speaking here and throughout the last two chapters seems similar to Aristotle's. Instead of using the technical term *'res'* he uses many pronouns and substantival adjectives or simply speaks of univocals and equivocals. In my translation I have been literal, refraining form supplying 'thing' in most cases.

[8] Since Augustine is talking about things in the preceding sentence, it is odd that he should use *'dictionibus'* here rather than something like *'dictis,'* which could be translated as 'things mentioned.' His choice of words may indicate an ambivalence on whether he is talking about univocal words or univocal things. See note 7, above.

[9] This definition is commonplace. It is found, for example, in Porphyry, *Isagoge* 1b 2–3, *Categoriae decem* XIX (*Ar. Lat.* I, p. 172, 20), Capella, IV.399, and Augustine, *De magistro* viii.24.

[10] Although 'plutocrat' may have a more special connotation than Augustine intends by *'divis,'* I have used it in order to have a one word translation which avoids the use of a qualifying adjective, as 'rich man' would.

CHAPTER X

[1] I have shortened the title from the one given by the Maurists – *'Ambiguitas ex aequivocis varia.'*

[2] Augustine's classification of equivocals is:

1. From art
   a. Can be examples of themselves
   b. Cannot be examples of themselves
2. From use
   a. From the same source
      i. Transference
         α. From whole to part
         β. From part to whole
         γ. Etc.
      ii. Declension
         α. By voice
         β. By signification
   b. From different sources
      i. Diversity of languages
      ii. In one laguage
         α. Same part of speech
         β. Different parts of speech

[3] See Ch. VII where *ars* also has to do with the disciplines which deal with words. There it is contrasted with *sensus*, here with *usus*.

[4] 'Tullius' is, of course, Cicero's *nomen*. Augustine uses it only in this chapter. I have not used the English form 'Tully,' since some of Augustine's comments are about the metric quality of the name.

[5] This is a somewhat puzzling sentence. *'Aequivoca'* is clearly applied to things, which in this case are the name of a man and a dactylic foot. A less literal translation would be: 'Tullius' is a word by which all the things said above are together equally signified (for *aequivoca*) by this expression. See note 7, Ch. IX.

[6] Notice that Augustine has added *'loquendi'* to the name for this kind of equivocation. When it was first introduced (17, 15), he called it merely *'usus.'* Probably he does not mean to add anything to the notion; the phrase *'usus loquendi'* is fairly common in earlier writers, for example, Varro (IX.6 and X.74). In any case it is clear that Augustine is now going to describe the types of ambiguity which occur when words are used to signify things (i.e., *dictiones*) as distinct from the types which occur when words are mentioned for the sake of various sorts of analysis *(verba)*.

[7] See Introduction, p. 6 for use of this passage in the *Libri Carolini*.

[8] I have not translated *'nomen'* by the more grammatical term 'noun' because, even though it is a noun in our sense of the word, for Latin grammar *'nomen'* included not only our nouns but also adjectives.

[9] The term does have both meanings, but I do not know the different origins of them.

[10] This list should be compared with the list of kinds of *vicinitas* in VI, 11, 2–8. There are six items in common, one unique to Ch. VI *(per abusionem)*, and three unique to Ch. X *(similitudine, a genere species, a specie genus)*.

[11] *'Pluit'* can be either the present or the perfect tense.

[12] Note the contrast between *'fit'* and *'est'* regarding these two words. Though *'homo'* is a name in both uses, it does different things, naming in the first and addressing in the second case. On the other hand, *'doctius'* is different in the two uses, being an adjective in the first instance and adverb in the second, though it does the same thing in both, namely, modifies.

[13] *'Tu'* is a form of the personal pronoun in Latin and could be confused with τοῦ, a form of the definite article in Greek.

[14] This is a hard sentence to make sense of as it stands. My translation depends partly on the emended version given by the Louvain and the Benedictine editions: Quod genus tamen non omnis novit: non enim unicuique perspicuum est, nisi qui linguas nosset aut qui linguas disputaret (*PL* 32, 1418). Their version of the sentence could be translated as: "But not everyone experiences this kind of ambiguity, for it will not happen to anyone unless he speaks several languages or at least is able to discuss them."

[15] At 19, 3.

[16] Terence, *Andria* III.iii.33, line 565.

[17] If the first syllable is short it is in the present tense, if long, it is in the perfect tense.

[18] Vergil, *Georgica* IV.487. *'Pone'* can be the imperative form of the verb *'pono'* (put, place) or it can be the adverb *'pone'* (behind), as it in fact is in the line from Vergil.

[19] Ch. IX, 16, 10–12.